Cultural politics and the appropriation of Theravada Buddhism in contemporary Burma (Myanmar)

In Burma, under the State Peace and Development Council, Burmese culture and Theravada Buddhism have become conjoined, the distinctions between the sacred and the secular have become blurred, and the political and the cultural have become intertwined, as the military regime seeks to legitimate its political power and authority.

The introduction, management and assessment of change process at Barwon Water, a technology based water authority

Covers managing change through a multifunctional change model linking a corporate strategy, longitudinal and cross organisational strategic drivers to a suite of change processes integrated synergistically to optimise customer service and business efficiency. Testing, analysis and benchmarking provide conclusions about the utility of the model and implementation strategies, change objective attainment, the strategic focus, learning outcomes and output achievement efficiency.

UN-consistent : a comparison of Australia's military interventions in Somalia and Rwanda

This article seeks to compare Australia's involvement in two key 1990s peace missions: those to Somalia in 1992-93 and Rwanda in 1994-95. While there are many similarities between the two missions in terms of time, scale and theatre, the differences are more important. Both missions are usually recalled as failures despite the Australian troops having been extremely successful in their roles during both deployments. Moreover the experiences with intervention in Africa seem to have forever blighted Australian participation in peace missions on that continent.

Anzac's dirty dozen : 12 myths of Australian military history

Review of Craig Stockings (ed.), Anzac's Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History, Sydney, New South, 2012.

Gadamer and political authority

The rehabilitation of the concept of authority is one of the more contentious positions advocated by Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960). Habermas in particular challenged the universality of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project by presenting this rehabilitation as a conservative legitimation of prevailing prejudices which truncates the role of critical reflection. Given that Gadamer’s primary focus is upon the ramifications of the Enlightenment dichotomy between reason and authority for historical hermeneutics, however, and that his examples are drawn primarily from educational domains, the extent to which his account of authority sustains a political interpretation is far from self-evident. In this article I argue that Gadamer’s account can nonetheless make at least two important contributions to contemporary philosophical debates on political authority. Following a brief exposition of Gadamer’s account of authority in Truth and Method, I examine his suggestion that the basis of legitimate political authority is to be found in the normative status of the right to be authoritative, rather than in the factual status of being in a position of authority. This account, I suggest, places in question the abstract dichotomy between theoretical and practical authority which informs much contemporary debate on political authority. I then demonstrate how Gadamer’s emphasis upon the historicity of tradition offers important insights for discussions of the relation between political authority and moral autonomy.

Finnis on the authority of law and the common good

This paper seeks to elucidate the role played by the common good in John Finnis's arguments for a generic and presumptive moral obligation to obey the law.1 Finnis's appeal to the common good constitutes a direct challenge to liberal and philosophical anarchist denials of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law.2 It is questionable, however, whether Finnis has presented the strongest possible case for his position. In the first section I outline Finnis's account of the relationship between basic goods, the common good, and the authority of law. Section II demonstrates how Finnis's emphasis upon the instrumental nature of the common good leaves his position vulnerable to Joseph Raz's objections3 that not all cases of law make a moral difference and that governmental authority is often unnecessary to resolve coordination problems. I argue that Raz's critique nonetheless fails adequately to address an alternative defense of the existence of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law, suggested by some passages in Finnis's work, according to which the common good is integral, rather than merely instrumental, to the good of individuals. In the final section I consider whether Finnis could strengthen his case for a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law by adopting a more consistently robust—and hence also more contentious—account of the common good.