Does control-ownership divergence impair market liquidity in an emerging market? Evidence from China

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.

Some hypotheses on commonality in liquidity: new evidence from the Chinese stock market

In this article, we examine four specific hypotheses relating to commonality in liquidity on the Chinese stock markets. These hypotheses are (1) that market-wide liquidity determines liquidity of individual stocks; (2) that liquidity varies with firm size; (3) that sectoral-based liquidity affects individual stock liquidities differently; and (4) that commonality in liquidity has an asymmetric effect. Drawing on a two-year data set on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges comprising over 34 million and 48 million transactions, respectively, we find strong support for commonality in liquidity and a greater influence of industry-wide liquidity in explaining liquidity of individual stocks. Moreover, our results suggest that of the three main sectors - financial, industrial, and resources - the industrial sectors liquidity is most important in explaining individual stock liquidities. Finally, we do not find any evidence of size effects and document an asymmetric effect of market-wide liquidity on liquidity of individual stocks.

The impact of mandatory versus voluntary auditor switches on stock liquidity: some Korean evidence

Using Korean listed firms subject to the auditor "designation rule", this paper shows that (1) firms that switch auditors exhibit lower stock liquidity than firms that do not switch auditors, and (2) the negative liquidity effect of auditor switches is concentrated in firms that switch to low-quality auditors. Meanwhile, firms that switch auditors under the auditor designation system do not exhibit lower stock liquidity, consistent with audit designation mitigating the concerns about audit quality deterioration around auditor changes. Furthermore, we find that foreign ownership has a mitigating impact on the negative relation between auditor switches and stock liquidity, suggesting that investors are less concerned about auditor switches when an alternative monitoring mechanism exists.

Stock market liquidity and firm value : an empirical examination of the Australian market

We document a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. We examine the mechanism through which stock market liquidity enhances firm value by dividing firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, into three components, namely, operating income to price, leverage, and operating income to assets. Using the switch to broker anonymity as an exogenous shock to market liquidity, we show that the increase in liquidity around the shock leads to an increase in firm value. Our results suggest that higher firm value for more liquid stocks seems to stem from enhanced stock prices rather than from better operating performance.