Expropriation of "old order" mineral rights in South Africa: the Constitutional Court has its say (twice)

The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (ZA) (MPRDA) makes provision for the conversion of so-called “old order” rights to prospecting and mining rights. The consequences of the failure of holders of old order rights to apply for (a) Conversion or (b) new rights under different circumstances were decided by the South African Constitutional Court in two decisions during 2013. These cases are discussed against the background of the nature, content and termination of old order rights. It is also discussed whether such rights were expropriated by the MPRDA and, if so, whether compensation is payable by the state.

How does the cookie crumble? legal costs under a uniform interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods

A family owned Mexican company, Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. ("Zapata"), sold approximately US$950,000 worth of cookie tins over a period of four years to the Maurice Lenell Cooky Company ("Lenell"), an American company that produced baked goods. Lenell failed to pay Zapata for the cookie tins so Zapata sought legal advice and instituted legal proceedings against Lenell for breach of contract in the Federal District Court of Illinios. The cookie tin sale contracts were governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). Zapata succeeded in its Federal District Court claim and, as part of the Court's order, was awarded US$550,000 as foreseeable loss under Article 74 of the CISG, being the amount of legal fees incurred by Zapata in bringing proceedings against Lenell. On appeal to the Federal Appellate Court, however, the award of legal fees was overturned. The parties now find themselves contesting a leave application to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States of America in a much anticipated debate over who should pay the lawyers.

Harmonisation and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods

After many years of negotiation, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) came into force in 1988. Today, 62 states have adopted the CISG. Together these countries account for over two-thirds of all world trade.2 On this basis alone, the CISG is an outstanding success in the legal harmonisation of the law governing the international sale of goods. However, the CISG has its critics and much comment has been made on the failure of the CISG to achieve its goal of promoting international trade through a body of uniform rules.The primary motivation driving the push for a harmonised law on the international sale of goods is economic: a harmonised law makes it easier and more efficient for the business person to sell and buy goods across state borders. However, the engine driving the push for harmonisation is political and cultural; and the task of creating the harmonised law belongs to the diplomat.3 A study of the CISG demonstrates that the political and cultural demands on the diplomat also act as shackles that restrain the achievement of a harmonised law.This paper will consider the CISG and discuss the constraints on treaty making as a mechanism for legal harmonisation. Part one discusses the constraints faced when creating a uniform text.Part two discusses the problems with the text of the CISG that result from the negotiation process. Finally, part three discusses the constraints faced in maintaining the uniformity of the CISG.

The establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission in Malaysia to improve the constitutional method of appointing the judges of the superior courts : a critical study

The Judicial Appointments Commission was established in Malaysia in 2009 to ensure unbiased selection of judicial candidates for the consideration of the Prime Minister, who has the final say regarding the appointment of judges to the superior courts. But the provisions concerning Prime Minister’s power to appoint the majority of the members of the Commission and his unfettered power of removing four of the five appointed members without assigning any reason, have calculatedly been devised for ensuring the selection of judicial candidates having right political patronage in accordance with the covert wishes of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s power of rejecting the Commission’s recommendations of multiple candidates renders the undertaking of a lengthy process of selection unproductive and useless. Thus the Judicial Appointments Commission has become a superfluous body with an ineffective modus operandi to attain the stipulated objectives of improving and complementing the constitutional method of appointing judges to the superior courts. Since the Federal Constitution of Malaysia has not empowered the Parliament to enact a law providing for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission, it also appears that the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009 is an invalid piece of legislation.