Optimal second best taxation of addictive goods in dynamic general equilibrium: a revenue raising perspective

In this paper we derive conditions under which optimal tax rates for addictive goods exceed tax rates for non-addictive consumption goods within a rational addiction framework where exogenous government spending cannot be financed with lump sum taxes. We reexamine classic results on optimal commodity taxation and find a rich set of new findings. Two dynamic effects exist. First, households anticipating higher future addictive tax rates reduce current addictive consumption, so they will be less addicted when the tax rate increases. Therefore, addictive tax revenue falls prior to the tax increase. Surprisingly, the optimal tax rate on addictive goods is generally decreasing in the strength of tolerance, since strong tolerance strengthens this tax anticipation effect. Second, high current tax rates on addictive goods make households less addicted in the future, affecting all future tax revenues in a way which depends on how elasticities are changing over time. Classic results on uniform commodity taxation emerge as special cases when elasticities are constant and the addiction function is homogeneous of degree one. Finally, we also study features of addictive goods such as complementarity to leisure that, while not directly related to the definition of addiction, are nonetheless properties many addictive goods display.

Optimal tax mix with merit goods

This paper deals with optimal taxation in a two‐class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal non‐linear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit good arguments via a pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability between consumption and leisure and show how the standard optimal tax results are modified due to merit good considerations.

The tax treatment of employee stock options : generous to a fault

In the 2000 budgets, both the federal and Ontario governments introduced changes to the tax treatment of employee stock options for the explicit purpose of making their tax treatment in Canada similar to or more favourable than that in the United States. The federal budget added a deferral, similar to that currently applicable to options granted by Canadian-controlled private corporations, for up to $100,000 per year of public company stock options. The Ontario budget introduced an exemption from tax for employees involved in research and development on the first $100,000 per year of employee benefits arising on the exercise of qualified stock options or on eligible capital gains arising from the sale of shares acquired by the exercise of eligible stock options. These proposals reflect the apparent acceptance by the two governments that there is a “brain drain” from Canada to the United States of knowledge workers in the “new” economy and that reductions in Canadian taxes should stem this drain. In the author’s view, the tax treatment of employee stock options, even without these changes, is overly generous. Both the federal and provincial proposals ignore the fact that most employee stock options are taxed more favourably in Canada than in the United States in any event. In particular, most employee stock option benefits in Canada are taxed at capital gains tax rates, whereas in the United States most are taxed at full rates. While the US Internal Revenue Code does provide capital gains tax treatment for certain employee stock option benefits, a number of preconditions must be met. Most important, the shares acquired pursuant to the options must be held for a minimum of one year after the option is exercised. In addition, there are monetary limits on the amount of options that qualify for capital gains treatment. In Canada, there are generally no holding period requirements or monetary limits that apply in order for the option holder to benefit from capital gains tax rates. Empirical evidence indicates that the vast majority of employees in the United States exercise their options and immediately sell the shares acquired. These “cashless exercises” do not benefit from capital gains treatment in the United States, whereas similar cashless exercises in Canada generally do. This empirical evidence suggests not only that the 2000 budget proposals are unwarranted, but also that the existing treatment of employee stock options in Canada is already more generous than that in the United States. This article begins with a theoretical “benchmark” for the taxation of employee stock options. The author suggests that employee stock options should be treated in the same manner as other income from employment. In theory, the value of the benefit should be included in income when the option is granted or vests. However, owing to the practical difficulty of valuing employee stock options, the theoretical benchmark proposed is that the value of the benefit (the difference between the fair market value of the shares acquired and the strike price under the option) be taxed when the shares are acquired, and the employer be entitled to a corresponding deduction. The employee stock option rules in Canada and the United States are then compared and contrasted with each other and the benchmark treatment. The article then examines the arguments that have been made for favourable treatment of employee stock options. Included in this critique is a review of the recent empirical work on the Canadian brain drain. Empirical studies suggest that the brain drain—if it exists at all—is small and that, despite what many newspapers and right-wing think-tanks would have us believe, lower taxes in the United States are not the cause. One study, concluding that taxes do have an effect on migration, suggests that even if Canada adopted a tax system identical to that in the United States, the brain drain would be reduced by a mere 10 percent. Indeed, even if Canada eliminated income tax altogether, it would not stop the brain drain. If governments here want to spend money in order to stem the brain drain, they should focus on other areas. For example, Canada produces fewer university graduates in the fields of mathematics, sciences, and engineering than any other G7 country except Italy. The short supply of university graduates in these fields, the apparent loss of top-calibre academics to US
universities, and the consequent lower levels of university research in these areas (an important spawning ground for new ideas in the “new” knowledge-based economy) suggest that Canada may be better served by devoting more resources to its university institutions, particularly in post-graduate programs, rather than continuing the current trend of budget cuts that universities have endured and may further endure if taxes are reduced.
As far as employee stock options are concerned, if Canada does want to look to the United States for guidance on tax reform (which it seems to do with increasing frequency of late), it should adopt the US rules applicable to nonstatutory options, which are close to the proposed benchmark treatment. In the absence of preferential tax treatment, employee stock options would still be included in compensation packages provided that there were sound business reasons for their use. No persuasive evidence has been put forward that the use of stock options, in the absence of tax incentives, is suboptimal. Indeed, the US experience suggests quite the opposite.

Exempt treatment of financial intermediation services under a value-added tax: an assessment of alternatives

Most countries with a value-added tax (VAT) exempt financial intermediation services from the tax. While exemption is generally perceived to be undesirable, it is also widely regarded as unavoidable because of technical difficulties in applying VAT to these services. This article reviews the standard rationale for exempt treatment and then considers the relative merits of two recent challenges raised in the tax literature. The first challenge involves the application of cash flow taxation to financial intermediation services in a manner that is consistent with an invoice/credit VAT (which is the dominant form). The second challenge proposes a comprehensive system of zero-rating of financial intermediation services, which is supported by a characterization of the household consumption of such services as non-taxable. The author argues that each of these alternatives to an exemption system suffers from both theoretical and practical implementation difficulties that make maintenance of exempt treatment the preferred approach, at least in the short term. There is, however, a simpler alternative to these fundamental reform options, involving modification of just one aspect of an exemption system to relieve some of its more problematic aspects. Many of the interpretative problems and associated inefficiencies that plague an exemption system arise from the need to distinguish between taxable and exempt financial services. The author argues that these difficulties can be eliminated, to a large extent, by basing the distinction on the form of prices. In support of this approach, he points out that it is consistent with the underlying reasons for the application of exempt treatment. The author considers a number of other possible modifications, but these are either rejected outright or viewed with a healthy skepticism. For example, the author is critical of the apparent rationale for the application of cash flow taxation to property and casualty insurers. He also rejects proposals that accept some looseness in the formulaic allocation by financial intermediaries of the costs of business inputs between exempt and taxable services for input credit purposes. In his view, an explicit reliance on pricing structures to draw the boundary between exempt and taxable services is preferable to the provision of relief for blocked input tax credits of financial intermediaries. Finally, the author is skeptical of the case for a policy response intended to address the tax bias under an exemption system for financial intermediaries to insource supplies.

Impact of the new business tax system (alienation of personal services income) Act 2000

The implications of categorising income as "personal services income" and the actual meaning of this term have been marked with uncertainty. The Commissioner of Taxation has long asserted that "personal services income" inherently may not be derived by an entity other than the person whose exertions produce the income. In Liedig v FCT (1994) 28 ATR 141, however, Hill J held that in the absence of a specific legislative provision, there was no basis for the Commissioner's doctrine. The specific legislative measures Hill J required were put in place through the New Business Tax System (Alienation of Personal Services Income) Act 2000. In certain circumstances this Act prevents interposed entities from deriving personal services income. Such payments are attributed instead to the individual who performs the services.

It will also be seen, however, that these provisions do not apply to entities that are conducting a "personal services business". It is submitted that the combined effect of, inter alia, the Act's definition of "personal services income" and "personal services business" is to give the Act a narrower scope than the Commissioner's personal services doctrine. Moreover, it will be submitted that the statutory definition of personal services income also suffers from the same flaws that Hill J identified as relevant to the Commissioner's personal services doctrine.

Part IVA - a toothless tiger?

Tax avoidance has been a problem for governments since taxes were introduced. Thirteenth century English property taxes were avoided by taxpayers moving their assets outside the sheriff’s jurisdiction. Even more conniving were the citizens of 17th century England who avoided the Window Tax by covering their windows before the tax collector’s visit.

Response : A defensible and workable approach to the income tax treatment of financial instruments

It is a privilege to have the opportunity to respond to the comments on my monograph1 provided by Mark Gergen, Glenn May, and Gordon Longhouse. Their comments, which are inevitably coloured by their very different perspectives, reflect the considerable expertise that each one of them has in the area of the income taxation of financial instruments. Indeed, it is with some hesitation that I offer a response in defence of various portions of the analysis presented in my monograph in support of some pretty modest proposals in this extremely difficult area of income tax law. Although I spent considerable time exploring some necessary first principles and their implications for the design of a system for the income taxation of financial instruments, I made several concessions to certain practical constraints that led me to support, in some measure, the status quo reflected in certain of the existing literature, as well as the legislation in a select group of countries. On the assumption that many readers may be unfamiliar with the monograph, I propose to respond by outlining much of my analysis in the monograph and the proposals that are the logical outcome. Throughout the outline, I will highlight and respond to what I see as the important points of difference emphasized by Gergen, May, and Longhouse.

Global profit split: An evolutionary approach to international income allocation

International taxation is concerned mainly with the equitable allocation of cross-border income between countries in which income-earning activities take place. Such allocation has traditionally been governed by the arm’s-length principle, which has been interpreted as requiring a comparable transactional pricing approach. This approach assumes that each member of a multinational enterprise (MNE) group is a separate entity and that the transactions between related parties can be separated and compared with arm’s-length transactions. It has, however, proved difficult to apply comparable transactional pricing to internationally integrated businesses, especially those involving intangibles and services, and formulary apportionment has been suggested as an alternative. Essentially, formulary apportionment treats the MNE group as a single economic entity. The group’s profit is allocated to members according to a formula that reflects the particular member’s contribution to the production of that profit. A rich academic literature exists which either defends or attacks this alternative approach. The OECD and national governments have rejected formulary apportionment mainly on the ground that it violates the arm’s-length principle. This article proposes a global profit split (GPS) method for allocating international income. The GPS would allocate the global profit of an integrated business to each country in accordance with the economic contributions made by components of the business located in that country. The allocation would be based on a formula that would reflect the economic factors that contribute to profit making. While the GPS draws on elements of the traditional formulary apportionment and profit split methods, it also differs from them. The author discusses in detail the key issues involved in designing the GPS. She also presents and evaluates the main policy and pragmatic justifications for the adoption of this innovative approach. The author argues that the GPS is not only theoretically and practically superior to traditional income allocation methods, but also consistent with the arm’s-length principle. On the basis of historical developments, interpretation of article 9 of the OECD model tax convention, and international tax policy considerations, the author establishes that the GPS is not a radical departure from the arm’s-length principle, but rather a natural development in its evolution. She concludes that the law of evolution ison the side of reform because the GPS would provide for a fair and effective allocation of income derived from globally integrated business activities.

Dissected debt : developing a better legislative response to FCT v Myer Emporium Ltd

After many decades of actual and proposed reform, Australia's rules for the taxation of debt arrangements remain deeply flawed. A notable problem is the absence of appropriate rules for dissected debt arrangements, where a creditor dissects a debt into interest and principal
repayment components and disposes of one or both of these separately, as occurred in the leading case ofFCT v Myer Emporium Ltd. The knee-jerk reaction to Myer by the High Court and the legislature is a model of bad tax policy and bad tax law. The approach adopted overseas, using the United States as the clearest example, is a logical one for Australia to follow.

Tourism, taxes and immiserization: A trade theoretic analysis

Many countries promote tourism as a device for earning foreign exchange and promoting domestic welfare and growth. In all these countries the non-traded goods (internationally not traded) are consumed by both domestic residents and tourists. It is well known that the relative price of non-traded goods and services is determined in the local market – hence the tourist demand results in monopoly power in trade for the host country. We use a very simple two-country model to demonstrate the specific nature of the offer curve and the trade equilibrium and the difficulties of taxation.

Characterising derivative-based loan arrangements

The income tax and GST laws contain an array of rules that apply to debt and gains in the nature of interest. The definitions of 'debt' or 'loan' and amounts in the nature of 'interest' vary across the provisions and tax officials, taxpayers and courts must decide whether the terms should be read as applying to debt, loans or interest in a narrow legal sense or should be read more broadly to catch multi-element arrangements that give effect to a debt or loan relationship in an economic or commercial sense but not in conventional single document form. This article reviews the UK, US and Australian approaches to interpreting multi-element transactions and considers whether four tax provisions dealing with debt should be interpreted to apply to multi-element, derivative-based loan arrangements.

Capital gains tax in South Africa : lessons from Australia?

In the budget review of23 February 2000, the South African Minister of Finance announced that a capital gains tax ('CGT') would be introduced into South Africa, the anticipated start date at that point being 1 April 2001. Pursuant to Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001, a CGT of general operation was introduced into the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the 'ITA 1962') through the insertion of the Eighth Schedule¹, read together with s 26A of the Act. Section 26A is the charging provision that states that a person's taxable income included their 'taxable capital gain'. As discussed below, the start date was revised to 1 October 2001.

Isolated transactions: current income tax implications

Profits from isolated transactions will often be potentially caught by the capital gains tax provisions of the income tax legislation. Because the provisions usually tax gains at concessional rates but only apply to gains that are not otherwise taxable, it is important to determine when gains from isolated transactions constitute ordinary income. This article discusses when isolated transactions generate ordinary income, as well as briefly mentioning what statutory provisions they might be assessable under. Isolated transactions will generate ordinary income when the transaction has the sufficient indicia of a business, or when it comes under one of the strands of Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Myer Emporium Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 199. However, the law in this area is complex and unclear in parts. The relevant tax ruling, TR 92/3, is incomplete and at times inaccurate and so is of very limited assistance.