Is money targeting an option for Bank Indonesia?

In this paper, using the cash-in-advance model, we estimate Indonesia's money demand function for the period 1970–2005. We find the real M1 and real M2 are cointegrated with their determinants, namely real income, real exchange rate and short-term domestic and foreign interest rates. The long-run elasticities, except for the relationship between M2 and domestic interest rate, are plausible. Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between real exchange rate and real money demand, suggesting evidence of currency substitution. We test for causal relationships and find that in the short-run only the real exchange rate Granger causes real M1 and real M2. Finally, we find that Indonesia's money demand functions are unstable. We conclude that money targeting is not an option for Bank Indonesian and that currency substitution should be curbed in order to ensure macroeconomic sustainability.

Corporate governance, board responsibilities and financial performance : the National Bank of Australia

This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank's (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB's performance is investigated by utilising accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 5 7.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB's experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.

Determinants of Central bank independence and governance : problems and policy implications

Central bank independence and governance (CBIG) is a term subject to conflicting definitions and so its related studies are difficult to compare. This paper therefore focuses on developing of a more useable definition, and an index model identifying the determinants of independence and governance and their possible policy implications. It also examines various independence measurement tools such as ranking and index. The index model resulting centres on key central bank independence and corporate governance issues, such as, legal aspects, political aspects, price stability objective aspects, exchange rate policy aspects, monetary policy and deficit financing aspects and finally, transparency and accountability aspects.