Realism and idealism in the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce

The thesis argues that there is a conjoining of realism and idealism in the mature thought of American philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Concludes that realism and idealism function together as a unit as they are both founded on an evolutionary conception of continuity and potentiality.

Philosophy of childhood: the foundational childhood needs and wellbeing

 The foundational needs of children and wellbeing have been examined through the India chakra system. This new needs theory assists in the understanding children’s basic needs as well as a way to diagnose the unmet needs of children. The model has applications for psychological and education systems as well as parenting.

The design philosophy of Edenic gardens: tracing ‘Paradise Myth’ in landscape architecture

This paper explores the Eden mythology in both western and eastern cultures, and its reflection on people’s perception and use of nature. It aims to examine how cultural ideologies and systems of beliefs in relation to Eden have affected landscape making and how landscape icons influenced other cultures subsequently. This study describes how narratives of Eden evolved and influenced landscape design by explaining the narratives of Paradise and Arcadia in eastern and western cultures as two distinct landscape narratives, with a brief history of their emergence and evolution. It discusses the ways in which landscape architecture reflects the prevailing attitudes towards nature in a society by studying the ancient world’s philosophies and ideologies as a starting-point for this investigation. The paper then focuses on the Persian paradise garden and explains the notion of iconography, as a visual explanation of an idea in landscape design. It projects the transformation of Persian paradise gardens’ icons and patterns in landscape architecture through historical and spatial explorations.

Nietzsche's perspectivism and problems of self-refutation

Nietzsche's perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine's apparent self-refuting character.  If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself?  Nietzsche's perspectivism must be construed either as a facts or as one further interpretation - but in the former case the doctine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one's perspective are rendered both impotent and superflouos.  The unpalatable consequencs of Nietzsche's perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche's treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction.  Finally, Nietzsche's perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense.  There is every reason, i conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche's perspectivism.