Dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer : the contribution of hermeneutics to understanding what a person is saying

This thesis reviews the development of philosophy of interpretation since the nineteenth century exemplified in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, It recognizes Gadamer as the foremost philosopher of hermeneutics in the twentieth century, who draws together the contributions of his predecessors into a major new development. The theme upon which this thesis engages in dialogue with Gadamer is concentrated on the problem of making experience the sole object of hermeneutics to the exclusion of persons and what they say, considered objectively. The problem with this is to express the role of interpretative practices philosophically if non-objectifying thinking is normative for hermeneutics. A solution is found by following up Gadamer’s insight into the influence of tradition on understanding, I show that tradition and its truth, as well as not being separable from the understanding subject's thinking, are also not detached from an author's intentions and are shared by human beings understanding one another. The transmissive nature of tradition discloses its own method for understanding what a person is saying and the ethical requirements of truth are forwarded by following that method.

Second person : a point of view? The function of the second person pronoun in narrative prose fiction

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Person - organisation fit : value congruence in attraction and selection decisions

ASA theory is one of the most important explanations of behaviour in organisations. Developed by Professor Ben Schneider, it is the idea that organisations contain similar types of people because they attract, select and retain people similar to those already employed by the organisation. This homogeneity explains why organisations are different to each other. Although a lot is known about attrition, little is known about the attraction and selection phases. This book contains a series of empirical studies that explore whether organisations attract and select people who hold the values of the people already employed by the organisation. The results of these studies cast doubt on how universal ASA theory might be and suggest that the initial employment decisions that people make are more about choosing their vocation than their employer.

Exploring multidimensional person-environment fit

The current study examines the validity of a multidimensional Person-Environment (PE) fit model proposed by Jansen and Kristof-Brown (2006). The overall aim of the paper is to test the model’s factor structure and influences upon outcome measures. A panel of organisational employees from a wide range of companies and locations were asked to complete a survey (n = 1875) measuring five discrete multidimensional facets of PE fit (Person-Organisation, Person-People, Person-Job, Person-Group and Person-Vocation) and three outcomes; organisational commitment, intention to leave and job satisfaction. The first sequence of analysis tested the proposed model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) statistical approaches. Model comparisons showed that Jansen and Kristof-Brown’s original model in which the five facets of fit coalesce into a multidimensional variable was a poor fit with the data, but that a model in which the five facets of fit operate independently was a good fitting one. The second sequence of analysis found that the model without the multidimensional variable strongly predicted the outcomes of commitment, job satisfaction and intention to leave. This paper discusses the implication of this research in relation to the PE fit literature.

Person-organization fit as a vehicle for knowledge sharing and creation

Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer. It is also context specific. Hence it is often argued to be a key strategic asset and as such attention to how it is created and transferred in organisation in critical to strategists. The transfer of tacit knowledge is however still a challenge. It is known that shared communication and socialization are important processes in the transfer of tacit knowledge and person–organization fit (POF) is associated with such phenomena. Hence we argue that POF is likely to shape the transfer of tacit knowledge with higher levels of one resulting in higher levels of the other. We explore the interaction of tacit knowledge and POF fit and develop a matrix that suggests a complex interaction between the two.

Use of the Screening tool of older person's prescriptions (STOPP) in older people admitted to an Australian hospital

Aims: To determine the prevalence of potentially inappropriate medications (PIMs) in older people aged 65years and over who were admitted to hospital, and to examine the medications and medication classes that comprised these PIMs with use of the Screening Tool of Older Person's Prescriptions. Method: Using a retrospective clinical audit design, the medical records of 100 older patients were randomly selected and examined for the prevalence and characteristics of PIMs. The audit was undertaken of patients admitted over a 12-month period to an Australian public teaching hospital. Results: In total, 92 individual occurrences of PIMs were detected, and 54 patients had at least one PIM. The most common type of PIM experienced related to prescribed medications that adversely affected individuals who were prone to falls. Conclusion: Many older patients experienced a PIM during their hospital admission, where the risk of an adverse event could outweigh the clinical benefit.

Development of mental health first aid guidelines on how a member of the public can support a person affected by a traumatic event: a Delphi study

BACKGROUND: People who experience traumatic events have an increased risk of developing a range of mental disorders. Appropriate early support from a member of the public, whether a friend, family member, co-worker or volunteer, may help to prevent the onset of a mental disorder or may minimise its severity. However, few people have the knowledge and skills required to assist. Simple guidelines may help members of the public to offer appropriate support when it is needed.

METHODS: Guidelines were developed using the Delphi method to reach consensus in a panel of experts. Experts recruited to the panels included 37 professionals writing, planning or working clinically in the trauma area, and 17 consumer or carer advocates who had been affected by traumatic events. As input for the panels to consider, statements about how to assist someone who has experienced a traumatic event were sourced through a systematic search of both professional and lay literature. These statements were used to develop separate questionnaires about possible ways to assist adults and to assist children, and panel members answered either one questionnaire or both, depending on experience and expertise. The guidelines were written using the items most consistently endorsed by the panels across the three Delphi rounds.

RESULTS: There were 180 items relating to helping adults, of which 65 were accepted, and 155 items relating to helping children, of which 71 were accepted. These statements were used to develop the two sets of guidelines appended to this paper.

CONCLUSIONS: There are a number of actions which may be useful for members of the public when they encounter someone who has experienced a traumatic event, and it is possible that these actions may help prevent the development of some mental health problems in the future. Positive social support, a strong theme in these guidelines, has some evidence for effectiveness in developing mental health problems in people who have experienced traumatic events, but the degree to which it helps has not yet been adequately demonstrated. An evaluation of the effectiveness of these guidelines would be useful in determining their value. These guidelines may be useful to organisations who wish to develop or revise curricula of mental health first aid and trauma intervention training programs and policies. They may also be useful for members of the public who want immediate information about how to assist someone who has experienced a potentially traumatic event.

Perspective taking and empathy: does having similar past experience to another person make it easier to take their perspective?

This study tested the hypothesis that it is easier to take the perspective of another person when one has similar past experience. Volunteer participants (N = 154) were asked to take the perspective of a protagonistin one of four problematic interpersonal situations and then to rate the ease with which they felt able to perspective take and the extent of their personal past experience of similar situations. Similar past experiencepredicted ease of perspective taking, with the relationship influenced by reflection on past experience. Ease of perspective taking mediated the relationship between similar past experience and participant perceptionsof their accuracy in understanding the other person, but ease was not associated with emotional arousal. The findings have potential therapeutic applications for attempts to increase empathy and understanding in people for whom perspective taking may be difficult.

Age-specific trends from 2000-2011 in all-cause and cause-specific mortality in type 1 and type 2 diabetes: a cohort study of more than one million people

OBJECTIVE: To analyze changes by age-group in all-cause and cause-specific mortality rates from 2000-2011 in people with diabetes. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: A total of 1,189,079 (7.3% with type 1 diabetes) Australians with diabetes registered on the National Diabetes Service Scheme between 2000 and 2011 were linked to the National Death Index. Mortality rates in the total population were age standardized to the 2001 Australian population. Mortality rates were calculated for the following age-groups: 0 to <40 years, ≥ 40 to <60 years, and ≥60 to ≤85 years. Annual mortality rates were fitted using a Poisson regression model including calendar year as a covariate and age and sex where appropriate, with Ptrend reported. RESULTS: For type 1 diabetes, all-cause, cardiovascular disease (CVD), and diabetes age-standardized mortality rates (ASMRs) decreased each year by 0.61, 0.35, and 0.14 per 1,000 person-years (PY), respectively, between 2000 and 2011, Ptrend < 0.05, while cancer mortality remained unchanged. By age, significant decreases in all-cause, CVD, and diabetes mortality rates were observed in all age-groups, excluding diabetes mortality in age-group 0-40 years. For type 2 diabetes, all-cause, CVD, and diabetes ASMRs decreased per year by 0.18, 0.15, and 0.03 per 1,000 PY, respectively, Ptrend < 0.001, while cancer remained unchanged. By age, these decreases were observed in all age-groups, excluding 0-40 years, where significant increases in all-cause and cancer mortality were noted and no change was seen for CVD and diabetes mortality. CONCLUSIONS: All-cause, CVD, and diabetes ASMRs in type 1 and type 2 diabetes decreased between 2000 and 2011, while cancer ASMRs remained unchanged. However, younger populations are not benefiting from the same improvements as older populations. In addition, the absence of a decline in cancer mortality warrants urgent attention.

Existentialist methodology and perspective: writing the first-person

Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism