The effect of Shamanic-like stimulus conditions and the cognitive-perceptual factor of schizotypy on phenomenology

Shamanism has remained an integral part of indigenous healing rituals since ancient times and is currently attracting interest as a complementary therapeutic technique in psychology. Recently, shamanic-like techniques have been used to facilitate changes in the phenomenology of nonshamans. However, such research has largely been delimited to a single shamanic-like technique (i.e., drumming), and the role of personality traits with regards to receptivity to this technique has been neglected. The purpose of the present study was to investigate experimentally the effect of different shamanic-like techniques and the cognitive-perceptual factor of the schizotypy construct on phenomenology. One hundred and four non-shamans were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Drumming, Ganzfeld, or Sitting Quietly with Eyes Open. Participants' phenomenology was assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory, Phenomenology associated with shamanic-like techniques appeared to be statistically significantly different from phenomenology associated with sitting quietly with eyes open. Furthermore, high cognitive-perceptual participants reported significant alterations in phenomenology compared to their low cognitive-perceptual counterparts. Methodological shortcomings of the present study are discussed and suggestions for future research are advanced.

The phenomenology of being-meditative

This thesis addresses the experience of being-meditative using a philosophical perspective. It discloses the ontological dynamics of meditative-Dasein and reveals the meditative modes of being-at-rest, a cultural and social mode of being, whose perceptual intentionality is unified by the authentic Care for Being, thereby enabling a Homecoming.

Phenomenology and the online : the importance of studying experience

 Phenomenological research into the online experience offers real value to Internet Studies and Digital Humanities scholars for three key reasons. Firstly, as an explicitly qualitative approach, it offers a way to gain insights into the experience of going online that are not identified by those who study behaviour alone. Secondly, as phenomenological studies focus on the individual rather than the collective, the resulting small sample size means that the investment required in terms of time spent with participants is minimised. Finally, the interpretation that emerges through the phenomenological research process produces categorisations that could form the basis on which larger scale, Big Data, quantitative research projects could be built.
This paper will explore the above ideas through the lens of my doctoral research, which uses hermeneutic phenomenology to investigate the experience of persona construction by artists on the fringes of the traditional art world, specifically craftivists, tattoo artists, street artists, and performance poets. By incorporating the interpretive categorisations that have come from my early discussions, I will demonstrate the strength of a phenomenological approach to investigating the experience of using the world and social media to present the self to the world.

Locke, Kierkegaard, and the phenomenology of personal identity

Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke’s original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given the distinctly normative (and indeed eschatological) focus of his discussion. To succeed, the Lockean project needs to identify some phenomenal property of experience that can constitute a sense of identity with the self figured in all moments to which consciousness can be extended. I draw upon key themes in Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of moral imagination to show that Kierkegaard describes a phenomenal quality of experience that unites the experiencing subject with its past and future, regardless of facts about psychological change across time. Yet Kierkegaard’s account is fully normative, recasting affective identification with past/future selves as a moral task rather than something merely psychologically desirable (Schechtman) or utterly contingent (Parfit, Strawson).

Hermeneutic phenomenology: a methodology of choice for midwives

Hermeneutic phenomenology has been used widely by researchers to understand lived experiences. This methodology asserts that individual people are as unique as their life stories. The practice of midwifery is underpinned by a philosophy that values women and the uniqueness of their child-bearing journey. The tenets of hermeneutics phenomenology align with those of contemporary midwifery practice, making it a useful research methodology for providing insights into issues relevant to the profession. The purpose of this paper is to unravel some foundational concepts of hermeneutic phenomenology and recommend it as a methodology of choice for midwives to apply to their application to midwifery-in-action.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

Book review : intending the world : a phenomenology of international affairs

Book review of Intending the World: A Phenomenology of International Affairs by Ralph Pettman.