Moral rights: a brief excursion into Canadian history

In 1931, Canada was the first of the copyright countries to adopt a moral rights provision, closely modeled on Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, into its legislation. But this was not the first step that Canada had taken towards the legislative protection of moral rights. Not only had certain provisions protective of the non-economic interests of authors been included in the federal Criminal Code and in the legislation of Quebec prior to 1920, but during the 1920s a sustained effort had been made to give these interests more explicit and systematic protection under the Copyright Act. The present article focuses on a series of bills put to the Canadian Parliament from 1924 onwards. Not only would they have provided increased protection for the non-economic interests of authors but they would have given a legislative definition to the term "moral right". These bills, framed in the absence of any influence from Article 6bis, provide a glimpse of what "moral rights" might have been. They support the view that Canada was moving towards the express legislative protection of these rights significantly earlier that is commonly thought.

The making of modern scientific personae: the scientist as a moral person? Emil Du Bois-Reymond and his friends

This article examines the notion of the 'scientist as a moral person' in the light of the early stages of the commodification of science and the transformation of research into a big enterprise, operating on the principle of the division of labour. These processes were set in train at the end of the 19th century. The article focuses on the concomitant changes in the public persona and the habitus of scientific entrepreneurs. I begin by showing the significance of the professional networks that were built up and maintained to further a group's research ideas and the careers of its members, thus demonstrating one condition on which depended their practice of science and their ability to earn a living. This leads to a characterization of the changing styles of work, thought and life, and to a consideration of public perceptions and of the ways in which a new self-image of scholarship and science was fashioned. A critical discussion of the public role of these mandarin scientists follows in order to highlight the strains created by the commodification of science at a time of international tensions and conflicts, when shared beliefs in scholarly cosmopolitanism were subverted by appeals to science and scholarship to work in the service of one's own nation as its 'courtiers'. Various considerations of peculiar analogies between national styles of research and the style of social organization are then noted. In the final section, the article queries the long-term impact of these developments on the ideal of the scientist as a 'moral person'. Taking a cue from Max Weber and pursuing reflections by Zygmunt Bauman on 'science moralized', I argue that the emergence of a type of 'specialists without spirit' was an unintended but fatal consequence of the changes in research practices promoted by scientific entrepreneurs such as Du Bois-Reymond. I conclude that the temptation to sever the ties to a general ethos of civil virtues lay in the rationalization, specialization and potential de-humanization of the objectifying scientific outlook once advocated for its efficiency.

Moral rights and substantiality: some questions of integration

Now that Australia has its long awaited legislation protecting the moral rights of authors, a new phase in the development of the rights begins. It must be asked how the incorporation of the rights into the existing copyright legislation, and their subjection to existing doctrines, will affect their operation. And how will existing doctrines be challenged and extended by the existence of the rights? Ultimately these questions will be worked out in the courts. The present article offers a consideration of one area where the legislature has purported to integrate moral rights into the existing scheme but where the practicalities oftheir integration are still unclear. It examines the interplay of moral rights with the doctrine of substantiality, suggesting that any clarification of what substantiality means in the moral rights context will be contingent upon the emergence of more precise definitions of what moral rights are and what interests they are intended to protect.

The minimum moral content of law : a critique of Hart's descriptive theory of positive and natural law

Review of H.L.A. Hart's account of the minimum moral content of law - assesses its consistency with the methodology provided in his description of the focal meaning or central case of law - particular focus is Hart's consideration of the ultimate end of man - how difficulties faced by Hart's account of the minimum moral content of law can be overcome.

Euthanasia and assisted suicide : a liberal approach versus the traditional moral view

Within the context of the debate over the recent suspended sentence given to John Stuart Godfrey by Underwood J in the Supreme Court of Tasmania for assisting his elderly mother with her suicide, this article examines some of the more popular arguments for and against the moral acceptability of euthanasia and assisted suicide. This article considers the arguments put forward on the “difference principle” by Rachels and Nesbitt before critically examining the liberal approach to the euthanasia issue as proposed by Kuhse. It is argued that whilst Kuhse is correct to reject the difference principle, she does so for the wrong reasons. The penultimate section of the article provides an overview of the traditional moral view against killing. The final part assesses whether the arguments put forward by proponents of the liberal approach are capable of overcoming this view.

Time to curtail summary dismissal in Australia

It is assumed that the right to summarily dismiss an employee for certain forms of misconduct is a fundamental legal right reposed in employers. It is argued that the scope of this right in Australia is too expansive and should be significantly curtailed. In its current form, the right to summarily dismiss employees offends several widely accepted legal and normative maxims and is incompatible with several behavioural norms. While this paper focuses on Australian summary dismissal law, the doctrinal analysis and the reform suggestions advanced in this paper are of relevance to all market economy jurisdictions. Studies of human well-being show that employment, independent of its wealth-creating aspect, is important to well-being. Matters that are central to a person's well-being should not be taken away readily. This moral prescription is given legal recognition by the legal principle of proportionality, which prescribes that there should be proportion between the punishment and harm caused by the wrongdoing. Moreover, it is not the case that a single impertinent act is defining of a person's character or necessarily evinces a predisposition to behave in a like manner in the future.

Beyond ethics : a community platform to secure moral integrity

Stakeholders perceive the role of accountants to reflect trust, honesty, impartiality, fairness and transparency. The aim of this paper is to explore avenues to strengthen the moral integrity of professional bodies and their members. The resulting recommendations include a community or "milieu" approach.

The value of information in an agency model with moral hazard

I show that the principal and the agent may each prefer that the principal or the agent has imperfect information about the principal's technology in a principal-agent environment with moral hazard. Principals expend considerable resources on data cumulation and analysis. However, such investments in information acquisition are benecial only if the agent will know that the principal is not ignorant or it allows the principal to implement a dierent action. When the principal is perfectly informed about her technology, the agent prefers to be ignorant. In addition, the value of perfect information for the agency is negative if the principal would implement the same action with either possible technology. I also investigate the dierences between ex ante and ex post contracting, and the ramications of the principal being ignorant or potentially ignorant about the technology. Finally, I determine if the principal's utility varies continuously with the degree of informativeness of the agent about the principal's technology. In this vein, I determine whether the agent's uncertainty may make the principal better o if she has the less informative technology.