Treaties as tools of foreign policy : a psychopolitical inquiry via Keatings's vision for Australia

Paul Keating will be remembered by some Australians as a visionary. As Prime Minister he outlined the structure of external and domestic reform that he believed would guarantee global security for all Australians. Driving these reforms, more often than not, were interstate agreements, often in the form of multilateral treaties, sometimes in the guise of bilateral compromise, rarely as unilateral declarations. In areas as diverse as collaborative scientific research or the protection of children in the workplace, the Keating Executive set out, through codification, to transform Australia’s political landscape. The fields of trade, military, environmental and human rights were all included in the attempts by Keating to forge a new image of and for Australia in the Asia Pacific region. Treaties were vital agents of change in this milieu in the bid to reformulate regional perceptions of Australia. The path of inquiry in this thesis stemmed from a quest to examine the origin, role, purpose and efficacy of treaties in the Keating Government’s foreign policy aimed at regional military security. In order to make this examination it develops a polyphonic1 analytical model whose purpose is to explore the psychopolitical underpinnings of these agreements. Thus the thesis has a two fold task. To develop an analytical model of how treaties work as tools of foreign policy and to outline and assess the Keating treaty strategy. Its principal contribution is on the theoretical side.

Australia and East Timor : elitism, pragmatism and the national interest

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

Enlistment and non-enlistment in wartime Australia : responses to the 1916 call to arms appeal

This article examines men’s responses to the 1916 ‘Call to Arms’ appeal, in which Australia’s federal government questioned military-aged male citizens on their willingness to enlist voluntarily in the armed forces for service at the front. It argues that the appeal illuminated men’s difficult negotiation of choice, in which they weighed their personal sense of obligation to the state at war, to their families, and to themselves. It shows how men not only confronted their decision, but measured their responsibilities against others’, producing a subjective order of sacrifice that paralysed recruiting. In the absence of conscription, that private decision-making was critical to the nature of Australia’s commitment to the war, as men assessed and re-assessed the limits of obligation for themselves.

Australia, New Zealand and cultural diplomacy in the Cold War : an unanticipated consequence of the Colombo Plan

Considers the part planned, part accidental ventures in public diplomcy by Australia and New Zealand during the 1950s and 1960s, resulting from membership of the Colombo Plan for aid to South and Southeast Asia.

Second families...first class. The experience of stepfamilies in Australia

Second families…first class explored stepfamilies in Australia and the difficulties they experience. The areas that caused higher levels of difficulty were legal and financial issues; and dealing with former partners. However, the findings also indicated many areas that provide few difficulties and many adults who are satisfied with stepfamily life.

The politics of Australia's withdrawal from Iraq

This article examines the complex matrix of public, political and policy debates that were brought to bear on Australia's decision to withdraw from Iraq. In analysing the ‘politics of withdrawal’ in Australia, this article identifies four dominant frames that served to polarise the issue along party-political lines and reduce the complexities of Australia's withdrawal to a set of simple polarities (such as ‘stay the course’ versus ‘responsible withdrawal’). Specifically, these frames obfuscated an assessment of the myriad challenges facing post-Saddam Iraq and the prospects for peace, security and development beyond Australia's withdrawal. Understanding the ways in which Australia framed its decision to disengage from Iraq is critical to further analysis of Australia's approach to current (or future) military draw-downs (such as in Afghanistan), as well as those conducted by other liberal democracies, such as the US and the UK.

Australian environments in war and peace: towards an environmental history of Australia at war

This paper introduces the concept of an environmental history of Australia at war, and explores the various avenues that might be investigated within this emerging, multidisciplinary theme. Specifically, this paper focuses on the environmental histories of militarised landscapes on the Australian homefront, including in particular the land and sea military training areas that form part of the Department of Defence’s three-million hectare estate, and examines how cycles of war and peace have affected these environments.