Analyst coverage and financing decisions

We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler’s(2002) “external finance-weighted” average market-to-book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.

Target behavior and financing: how conclusive is the evidence?

The notion that firms have a debt ratio target that is a primary determinant of financing behavior is influential in finance. Yet, how definitive is the evidence? We address this issue by generating samples where financing is unrelated to a firm’s current debt ratio or a target. We find that much of the available evidence in favor of target behavior based on leverage ratio changes can be reproduced for these samples. Taken together, our findings suggest that a number of existing tests of target behavior have no power to reject alternatives.

The effect of auditor quality on financing decisions

We present a model and provide empirical evidence showing that auditor quality affects the financing decisions of companies, and that higher audit quality reduces the impact of market conditions on client financial decisions and capital structure. Consistent with our analytical predictions, we find that companies audited by Big 6 firms are more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt than are those audited by small audit firms. We also find that companies audited by Big 6 auditors are able to make larger equity issues than are those audited by small auditors, but the difference narrows when market conditions improve. Additional results show that the debt ratios of companies decrease less in response to favorable market conditions when auditor quality is high, at least over the medium term.