The evidential problem of evil

The evidential problem of evil is the problem of determining whether and (if so) to what extent the existence of evil (or certain instances, kinds, quantities, or distributions of evil) constitutes evidence against the existence of God, that is to say, a being perfect in power, knowledge and goodness. Evidential arguments from evil attempt to show that, once we put aside any evidence there might be in support of the existence of God, it becomes unlikely, if not highly unlikely, that the world was created and is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being. Such arguments are not to be confused with logical arguments from evil, which have the more ambitious aim of showing that, in a world in which there is evil, it is logically impossible – and not just unlikely – that God exists.

This entry begins by clarifying some important concepts and distinctions associated with the problem of evil, before providing an outline of one of the more forceful and influential evidential arguments developed in contemporary times, viz., the evidential argument advanced by William Rowe. Rowe’s argument has occasioned a range of responses from theists, including the so-called "skeptical theist" critique (according to which God’s ways are too mysterious for us to comprehend) and the construction of various theodicies, that is, explanations as to why God permits evil. These and other responses to the evidential problem of evil are here surveyed and assessed.

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.

Rowe's new evidential argument from evil : problems and prospects

This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe's new argument, I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe's argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William Wainwright as well as Rowe's attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable dijficulties in Rowe's challenge to theism.

Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?

Hard determinism, in theological dress, holds that there is no human free will since God is the sufficient active cause of everything that happens in creation. It is surprising that, in the ever-growing literature on the problem of evil, very little attention has been paid to theodicies that adopt a hard determinist outlook. It is commonly assumed that without free will the theodical project is a non-starter. I challenge this long-held assumption by, firstly, developing a cumulative-style theodicy from within a hard determinist framework, and secondly, comparing the merits of such a theodicy with two libertarian rivals, specifically, Molinism and open theism. The hard determinist model of divine providence is, I argue, in no worse shape than the principal models developed by libertarians.

Theodicy : the solution to the problem of evil, or part of the problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

Mimicry and the eye of the beholder

Recent experiments (Dittrich et al. (Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 251, 195 (1993))) suggest that pigeon perception of wasp mimicry by hoverflies is similar to that of humans and of computer-based image matching. However, the relations are nonlinear and may explain why some species are abundant despite their being poor mimics to the human eye. We suggest that these discrepancies between pigeon and human categorization may lie in the differences between avian and primate colour vision. As pigeon categorization and computer image analysis were both assessed by using colour slides designed for human vision, they lacked the natural colour information available to wild birds, in particular that from ultraviolet (uv) wavelengths.

Applications of aptamers in nanodelivery systems in cancer, eye and inflammatory diseases

Aptamers are an interesting class of molecules that have potential in many facets of human health. They are characterized by high affinity and specificity to their targets, are small in size, have similar properties to antibodies, but are made synthetically. All of these properties, among others, give aptamers the potential to diagnose, image and treat like no other molecules. By combining the unique properties of aptamers with the ever expanding field of nanotechnology and all it has to offer, we are entering a very promising new area of targeted nanodelivery treatments. These treatments have found success in the complex disease processes of cancer, eye and inflammatory diseases.