The intoxication defence: toward a better understanding of current doctrine and reform

This article deals with the contentious issue of the extent to which an intoxicated person, particularly one who has become inebriated of his or her own volition, should be permitted to escape liability on the basis that the degree of inebriation was sufficient to preclude the fact-finder from finding a volitional act or omission on the part of the accused and/or that he or she acted with the required mens rea, if any, as defined by the common law or statutory definition of the offence. In addressing this issue, the article embarks upon a thorough analysis of the House of Lords seminal decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski (1977) AC 443 which, despite some very harsh criticism of late, continues to be the leading authority on the question in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. As part of this analysis, the article examines and ultimately attempts to resolve the longstanding controversy over what has proved to be the elusive distinction between crimes of basic or general intent and those of specific intent. The article concludes by rejecting the Majewski principles in favour of those enunciated by the High Court of Australia in R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 54 ALJR. In reaching this conclusion, the article notes various legislative and academic proposals for reform as well as statutory reforms in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia.

The South African Doctrine of Notice: a comparative law perspective

The doctrine of notice was received into South African law in Cohen v Shires, Mchattie and King (1881-1884) 1 SAR TS 41 by reference to a 17th century Dutch decision and English equity.The reception of the polar star of equity has led to doctrinal problems and differing views as to requirements for the operation of the doctrine ever since. This is illustrated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Meridian Bay Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA). The Court mentioned fraud and equity as the doctrinal basis but also accepted the view that the doctrine is an anomaly which does not fit into the principles of either the law of delict or property law.The Court required actual notice (or dolus eventualis) and wrongfulness for the operation of the doctrine of notice. In the following discussion of the decision it is argued that for the operation of the doctrine it should be required that: (a) a prior personal right aimed at the acquisition of a real right existed; (b) a holder of a subsequent personal right was actually aware or foresaw the possibility of the existence of the prior personal right; and (c) the holder of the real right nonetheless infringed upon the prior personal right by concluding a subsequent contract and obtaining registration of the real right in the deeds office.