Australian multicultural policy: social cohesion through a political conception of autonomy

This article provides an account of the governance discourses informing Australia’s multicultural policy history. The article problematises the liberal ideologies informing these discourses – as essentialising the cultural identity of minority groups within exclusionary values about what constitutes the common good. Highlighting the ongoing imperative of questioning current frames for understanding and approaching multiculturalism, the article strengthens existing research that calls for alternative models that support a political conception of autonomy. The key argument is that social cohesion, unity and solidarity can be engendered through this conception where a situationally defined, rather than essentialised, view of culture enables recognition and legitimising of a proliferation of voices and versions of national identity and the common good.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.

Whole school values and the socially transformative potential of philosophy education

The socially transformative potential of philosophy education (PhE) to support a broadening of students' horizons and a fostering of their ability to deal with difference and diversity is the focus of this article. This article explores this potential through its examination of whole school values and PhE at one primary school in Queensland, Australia. The central argument is that the school's prioritizing of social outcomes within its values framework can be supported by PhE at the classroom level. In making this case, this article draws on interview data from the school principal (“Ms A”), the school's Philosophy Mentor and Grade Four teacher (“Ms B”) and a Year 4 PhE student (“Jacob”). Given the transformative role schools are expected to play in the teaching of values, the centrality of school and teacher values in shaping student learning and the potential of PhE to enhance the social outcomes of schooling, this article provides a warrant for further interrogation of the agenda and values transmitted through this curriculum area.

The philosopher's courtly love? Leo Strauss, Eros, and the law

This essay poses a critical response to Strauss' political philosophy that takes as its primary object Strauss' philosophy of Law. It does this by drawing on recent theoretical work in psychoanalytic theory, conceived after Jacques Lacan as another, avowedly non-historicist theory of Law and its relation to eros. The paper has four parts. Part I, `The Philosopher's Desire: Making an Exception, or “The Thing Is...''', recounts Strauss' central account of the complex relationship between philosophy and `the city'. Strauss' Platonic conception of philosophy as the highest species of eros is stressed, which is that aspect of his work which brings it into striking proximity with the Lacanian-psychoanalytic account of the dialectic of desire and the Law. Part II, `Of Prophecy and Law', examines Strauss' analysis of Law as first presented in his 1935 book, Philosophy and Law, and central to his later `rebirth of classical political philosophy'. Part III, `Primordial Repression and Primitive Platonism', is the central part of the paper. Lacan's psychoanalytic understanding of Law is brought critically to bear upon Strauss' philosophy of Law. The stake of the position is ultimately how, for Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Law is transcendental to subjectivity, and has a founding symbolic force, which mitigates against speaking of it solely or primarily in terms of more or less inequitable `rules of thumb', as Plato did. Part IV, `Is the Law the Thing?' then asks the question of what eros might underlie Strauss' paradoxical defense of esoteric writing in the age of `permissive' modern liberalism - that is, outside of the `closed' social conditions which he, above all, alerts us to as the decisive justification for this ancient practice.

Pierre Hadot (1922-2010)

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). His work has been widely influential in classical studies and on thinkers, including Michel Foucault. According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher. However, according to Hadot, with the advent of the Christian era and the eventual outlawing, in 529 C.E., of the ancient philosophical schools, philosophy conceived of as a bios largely disappeared from the West. Its spiritual practices were integrated into, and adapted by, forms of Christian monasticism. The philosophers’ dialectical techniques and metaphysical views were integrated into, and subordinated, first to revealed theology and then, later, to the modern natural sciences. However, Hadot maintained that the conception of philosophy as a bios has never completely disappeared from the West, resurfacing in Montaigne, Rousseau, Goethe, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer, and even in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Heidegger.

Hadot’s conception of ancient philosophy and his historical narrative of its disappearance in the West have provoked both praise and criticism. Hadot received a host of letters from students around the world telling him that his works had changed their lives, perhaps the most fitting tribute given the nature of Hadot’s meta-philosophical claims. Unlike many of his European contemporaries, Hadot’s work is characterized by lucid, restrained prose; clarity of argument; the near-complete absence of recondite jargon; and a gentle, if sometimes self-depreciating, humor. While Hadot was an admirer of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and committed to a kind of philosophical recasting of the history of Western ideas, Hadot’s work lacks any eschatological sense of the end of philosophy, humanism, or the West. Late in life, Hadot would report that this was because he was animated by the sense that philosophy, as conceived and practiced in the ancient schools, remains possible for men and women of his era: “from 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own” (PWL 280).

Controlling the philosophical imaginary: reading Pierre Hadot with Luiz Costa Lima

This essay proffers a critical complement to Luiz Costa Lima's claims concerning the nature, history, and control of the imagination in Western culture. Accepting the wide scope of Costa Lima's critical claim about the socio-political control of imaginative literature in Western history, we claim that Pierre Hadot's work on philosophy as a bios in the ancient West cautions us lest we position philosophy in this history as always and necessarily an agency of control. At different times, philosophy has rather stood as an ally in practicing and promoting forms of criticity, and the playful, creative, and transformative envisaging of alternative ways of experiencing the world Costa Lima theoretically celebrates in literary fiction. Any critique of philosophy as always opposed to the critical imagination can only stand, we have argued, relative to philosophy as conceived on what Hadot suggests is but one, albeit the now hegemonic model: namely, as a body of systematic rational discourses, including discourses about the literary, poetics, and imaginary. What this vision of philosophy misses, Hadot shows, is how the ancient conception of philosophy (which survives in figures like Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Goethe) as a way of life promoted distinctly literary, aesthetic, and imaginative practices; first, to assist in the existential internalisation of the schools' ideas; secondly, to envisage in the sage and utopias edifying counterfactuals to help students critically reimagine accepted norms; and thirdly, in the conception of a transformed way of living and perceiving ‘according to nature’, whose parameters of autonomy and pleasurable contemplation of the singularity of the present experiences anticipate the experiences delineated in modern aesthetic theory.

Socratic ironies: reading Hadot, reading Kierkegaard

This paper examines the seemingly unlikely rapport between the ‘Christian existentialist’, radically Protestant thinker, Søren Kierkegaard and French classicist and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot, famous for advocating a return to the ancient pagan sense of philosophy as a way of life. Despite decisive differences we stress in our concluding remarks, we argue that the conception of philosophy in Hadot as a way of life shares decisive features with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true ‘religious’ life: as something demanding existential engagement from its proponent, as well as the learning or recitation of accepted doctrines. The mediating figure between the two authors, the paper agrees with Irina (2012), is Socrates and his famous irony. In order to appreciate Kierkegaard’s rapport with Hadot, then (and in contrast to Gregor, who has also treated the two figures) we first of all consider Hadot’s treatment of the enigmatic ‘old wise man’ who remains central to Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. (Part 1) However, to highlight Hadot’s Socratic proximity to Kierkegaard (in contrast to Irina), we set up Hadot’s Socrates against the contrasting portrait readers can find in John M. Cooper’s recent work on Socrates and philosophy as a way of life. Part II of the essay turns back from Hadot’s and Kierkegaard’s Socrates towards Hadot’s own work, and argues—again moving beyond both Gregor and Irina’s works on Hadot and Kierkegaard—that the shape of Hadot’s ‘authorship’, including his remarkably classical style, can be understood by way of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication. In our concluding remarks, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, we pinpoint the fundamental difference between the two thinkers, arguing that for Hadot in contrast to Kierkegaard, a stress on existential commitment in no way speaks against the philosophical defence of a form of rational universalism. Reading Hadot via Kierkegaard allows us to appreciate Hadot’s novelty as attempting to ‘squaring the circle’ between an emphasis on subjectivity and, as it were, the subjective dimensions of philosophers’ pursuit of rational universality.

Realism and idealism in the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce

The thesis argues that there is a conjoining of realism and idealism in the mature thought of American philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Concludes that realism and idealism function together as a unit as they are both founded on an evolutionary conception of continuity and potentiality.

Emotion, reason and tradition : essays on the social, poltical and economic thought of Michael Polanyi

This collection of essays demonstrates the continuing importance of the work of Michael Polanyi for the understanding, not only of the great events of the 20th century, but also of the problems that face us in the 21st century. Polanyi moved liberalism away from a negative, sceptical and rationalist basis towards an acceptance of trust, tradition and faith in transcendent values. His conception of the free society is not one merely of doing as one pleases nor vacuously 'open', but one of individual and communal self-dedication to those values and ideals.These essays, authored by a distinguished international and interdisciplinary panel of invited contributors, examine Polanyi's specific insights in the theory of knowledge, the nature and source of social order and the philosophy of economics and science and draw relevant comparisons between Polanyi and related thinkers such as Popper, Hayek and Mises. This book shows the sources of Polanyi's ideas and his distinctive contribution to philosophy generally, to social and political thought and to economics.

Theories of international relations

This collection of essays demonstrates the continuing importance of the work of Michael Polanyi for the understanding, not only of the great events of the 20th century, but also of the problems that face us in the 21st century. Polanyi moved liberalism away from a negative, sceptical and rationalist basis towards an acceptance of trust, tradition and faith in transcendent values. His conception of the free society is not one merely of doing as one pleases nor vacuously 'open', but one of individual and communal self-dedication to those values and ideals.These essays, authored by a distinguished international and interdisciplinary panel of invited contributors, examine Polanyi's specific insights in the theory of knowledge, the nature and source of social order and the philosophy of economics and science and draw relevant comparisons between Polanyi and related thinkers such as Popper, Hayek and Mises. This book shows the sources of Polanyi's ideas and his distinctive contribution to philosophy generally, to social and political thought and to economics.

Dummett and the origins of analytical philosophy

Michael Dummett has argued that the linguistic turn, initiated by Frege, is the decisive moment in the birth of the analytical tradition and what distinguishes that tradition from other movements. The thesis of the paper is that Dummett’s account of the origins of the analytical tradition understates the extent to which Frege’s work, and the linguistic turn more generally, are responses to antinomies in the modern philosophical project. An adequate characterisation of the origins of the analytic tradition presupposes an account of the fundamental conceptual shift that occurred during the time of the scientific revolution and the epistemological problems that arose in conjunction with this shift. This is why it is misleading to assert, with Dummett, that the really interesting developments in terms of understanding the analytical tradition are subsequent to Frege. The most productive contrast in terms of understanding the origins of the analytical tradition is not between pre and post Fregean thought, the paper argues, but between modern and premodern conceptions of philosophy and its relation to the world of everyday experience.

Multicultural thought in Australia : the legacy of Jerzy Zubrzycki

This paper redresses common misconceptions concerning the origins of Australian Multiculturalism by returning to the thought of Jerzy ‘George’ Zubrzycki (1920–2009). Zubrzycki’s view of multiculturalism is based on Durkheimian sociology, and thus needs to be conceived as a philosophy and policy of effectively managing integration, the goal of which is the minimizing of anomie. The concern with building a well integrated and cohesive society around a pluralist cultural framework was paramount to Zubrzycki. I see an understanding of Zubrzycki’s thought as essential to an understanding of the way the policy has been articulated by successive governments. However, this paper also points to the need to move beyond the theoretical framework and concepts used by Zubrzycki in directions that can better respond to new social challenges and realities. Section One gives a description of the central intellectual features underpinning Zubrzycki’s thought. Section Two then looks at Zubrzycki’s original conception of multiculturalism and the features that remain relevant to contemporary policy and public debates. Section Three moves beyond Zubrzycki’s more conservative thought in order to conceive of a cultural pluralism more responsive to and inclusive of the increasingly non-Western demographic changes in Australian society.

'O que é o "subalterno" da filosofia da religião? / What Is the “Subaltern” of the Philosophy of Religion?

The The 18th-19th centuries orientalist preoccupations with mythology and ancient perennis lacked both a critical-theoretical sensitivity to historiography anchored in radical historical consciousness and a deep sense of philosophical argumentation, as distinct from discerning mythic patterns of textual (intra-textual or internal) disputation and its interpretative ramifications from another felicitous perspective, usually theology mitigated by whatever remains ‘modern’ in the arts. Philosophy of Religion on the other hand remained heavily straddled in the rigors of logic, reason, analysis, dialectic, reason, reductio, aggressive refutation, within established frameworks drawing from the other branches of philosophy, namely, again, logic, epistemology, ontology and metaphyics. This paper presents a view 'from below' to demonstrate and argue how philosophy o religion must change in the post-colonial era and pay more attention to indigenous patterns of theological thinking and critiquing of Western enlightenment-centred philosophy of religion. It is in Portuguese though.

Georgics of the mind and the architecture of fortune: Francis Bacon's therapeutic ethics

This essay complements recent work by Soreana Corneanu situating Bacon’s epistemology in a larger lineage of literature concerning ‘cultura animi’ in early modern Europe, by focusing on Bacon’s conception of a therapeutic philosophical ‘Georgics of the mind’ in The Advancement of Learning, the Essays, and other texts. We aim to show firstly (in Part 2) how Bacon’s conception of human nature, and the importance of habit and custom, reflects the ancient pagan thinkers’ justifications of philosophical therapeutics. Attention will also be paid in this connection to Bacon’s sensitivity to another marker of ancient therapeutic philosophy as Pierre Hadot in particular has recently presented it: the proliferation of different rhetorical and literary forms aiming at different pedagogic, therapeutic, and psychogogic aims. Part 3 then will examine Bacon’s changes in practical or ‘magistral’ philosophy, carried out on the therapeutic ethical grounds which Part 2 has examined, but proposing a much more active ‘architecture of fortune’ to philosophical and political aspirants.