Identification of a gene for an ancient cytokine, interleukin 15-like, in mammals; interleukins 2 and 15 co-evolved with this third family member, all sharing binding motifs for IL-15Rα

Interleukins 2 and 15 (IL-2 and IL-15) are highly differentiated but related cytokines with overlapping, yet also distinct functions, and established benefits for medical drug use. The present study identified a gene for an ancient third IL-2/15 family member in reptiles and mammals, interleukin 15-like (IL-15L), which hitherto was only reported in fish. IL-15L genes with intact open reading frames (ORFs) and evidence of transcription, and a recent past of purifying selection, were found for cattle, horse, sheep, pig and rabbit. In human and mouse the IL-15L ORF is incapacitated. Although deduced IL-15L proteins share only ~21 % overall amino acid identity with IL-15, they share many of the IL-15 residues important for binding to receptor chain IL-15Rα, and recombinant bovine IL-15L was shown to interact with IL-15Rα indeed. Comparison of sequence motifs indicates that capacity for binding IL-15Rα is an ancestral characteristic of the IL-2/15/15L family, in accordance with a recent study which showed that in fish both IL-2 and IL-15 can bind IL-15Rα. Evidence reveals that the species lineage leading to mammals started out with three similar cytokines IL-2, IL-15 and IL-15L, and that later in evolution (1) IL-2 and IL-2Rα receptor chain acquired a new and specific binding mode and (2) IL-15L was lost in several but not all groups of mammals. The present study forms an important step forward in understanding this potent family of cytokines, and may help to improve future strategies for their application in veterinarian and human medicine.

Killing the father, Parmenides: on Lacan’s anti-philosophy

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and (in a remarkable confirmation of Lacan’s “Parmenidean” conception of philosophy) the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj Žižek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit (as against mere illusion or falsity) that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.

Hydraulic economy and logographic writing in ancient China: factor of topography

Chinese civilisation is characterised by two distinctive features – a strong centralised administration and the system of logographic writing. This paper investigates nature’s powerful impacts on human development, in terms of organisation and communication in ancient China. It argues that ancient China’s topography played a crucial role in the formation of ancient Chinese civilisation and its hydraulic economy pushed the state stronger than society, hence a strong centralised government emerged.

Burning books and burying scholars: on the policies of the short-lived Qin Dynasty in ancient China (221-207 BC)

In 221 BC, the battle-hardened warriors of the Qin state, the western frontier state and the most aggressive of the Warring States, subjugated the last of its rival states, thus establishing the Qin dynasty, with itscapital in Xianyang, near the modern Xi’an. The Qin dynasty is customarily regarded by Chinese and Western scholars as the beginning of a new age – the Chinese empire – that lasted until 1911 AD. The dynasty lasted only fifteen years. This study examines the main policies of the Qin dynasty and seeks to address the question what brought the quick downfall of the Qin rule. This paper takes the cultural and political contexts carefully into consideration, and argues that the Qin annexation of its rival states might be better understood as an end of an old era as much as a beginning of a new epoch.