Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.

Are Chinese stock markets increasing integration with other markets in the greater China region and other major markets?

This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai A and B-share market, and between these two markets and the Hong Kong, the Taiwanese, the Japanese and the US market of two sub periods between July 1993 and March 2007. On the basis of a new Granger non-causality test procedure developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995) and Johansen’s (1988) cointegration test, my results suggest that a long-term equilibrium relationship measured by cointegration has been merged between
the Chinese A-share market and the other markets in greater China region as well as the US market during the post-crisis period which covers the period since Chinese A-share market was opened to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. I also found that the Shanghai A-share market uni-directionally Granger-causes the other regional markets after the Asian financial crisis, while the A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market have had a significant feedback relationship since then. However, I found no evidence there has been cointegrating relationship between Shanghai B-share market and any other market ever since the B-share market was opened to the local retail investors in 2001.

Australia and Japan after the second world war: constructing new futures in Asia

The subject of my lecture is Australian-Japanese relations since the end of the Second World War, but I’m keen to explore these relations in the context of ideas, efforts and practical results in relation to collaborative and other efforts towards regionalism in the Asia Pacific. My general argument is that, on the one hand, Australian-Japanese relations have developed with a strength that would have been hard to imagine in 1945, and with an important focus on regional growth and security. The incremental steps taken may have been small and at a steady pace but, given the legacy of deep scars resulting from the Second World War and given the limitations on the defence aspects of Japan’s postwar involvement in regional affairs (ie the self defence requirement of the Constitution and the practice of spending not more than one per cent of Gross National Product on defence), these have been very successfully negotiated steps. On the other hand, there are some opportunities for greater joint leadership in the region which may or may not be realized. The incremental steps took place in difficult and changing circumstances; and what I would like to do now is remind us of how many unknowns attached to what might happen in Australian- Japan relationships after the Second World War, partly because there were so many unknowns about how the post-war international order would settle, and partly because Australian-Japanese relations started from such a desperately low point. I will try to walk through some of the key features of different periods, as I see the periodisation logically falling out after the war, and draw some thoughts together in relation to more recent initiatives on regional and bilateral co-operation. My training is as a historian, and that shapes the way this lecture works, and for most of my career I have been an Australian historian of international relations, looking particularly at Australia’s changing role in world affairs, and that is also likely to show in what follows－possibly at the expense of greater detail from Japanese perspectives. But I hope you will understand that, and also the limitations involved in trying to paint with a broad brush on a huge historical canvas.

The relevance of Asian development bank: existing in the shadow of the Asian infrastructure investment bank

This paper analyses the potential impact of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) on the Japan-USA-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). Given the financial strengths and the technical know-how of the newly formed AIIB there is a question about thefuture role and indeed relevance of the ADB. The questions canvassed in this article refer to ADB’s ability to change and adapt to the new situation, where it is no longer the dominant multi-lateral development bank (MDB) in the Asia-Pacific region. Against this background the discussion turns to issues concerning the geo-political sphere of influence of the ADB andAIIB and analyses the ADB – AIIB geo-political equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region. Subsequently this paper discusses factors that may impact on ADB’s future relevance.

Has China displaced its competitors in high tech trade?

This paper empirically investigated the extent to which China displaced its competitors in high-tech exports using disaggregated data for the period 1992–2013. To address the endogeneity problem, we used a comprehensive set of instruments for Chinese high-tech exports in relevant markets, including China's GDP and distances to those markets. Results of our IV regressions revealed that in most of the high-tech sectors, Chinese exports had displaced the exports of its developing competitors such as India, South American exporters like Brazil and Mexico, and South-East Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, especially in the period prior to the 2007–08 global financial crisis. Yet, Chinese exports had been associated with more high-tech exports of developed exporters like OECD countries, South Korea and Japan. Our findings suggest that while China became the world's top high-tech exporter, its high-tech exported products had been substitutes to those of other developing and emerging economies but complementary to that of developed economies.