Oljudens musik : En revolution i kompositionsteknik?

Noise music is created around sounds not often welcome in a musical context. Since the birth of electronic music in the 1950s a new perspective on composing has emerged. In electronic music, sounds and their timbre are as much important as melody, harmony and rhythm. This composing perspective is not often observed. Therefore I have examined a musical genre that stretches the boundaries of what we consider music, sound, noise, beautiful and terrible. The aim of this thesis is to investigate what aesthetic ideals noise musicians have when they create music. I examine the composing processes of three noise musicians, by asking the following questions: Do you compose in advance or do you improvise, how do your control of sound look like, how do you use the human voice and how do you categorize sound? The thesis is constructed around interviews I have made with the musicians and an extensive historical background concentrated on the alternative composing techniques that has led to the development of noise music. Among the results I found that these noise musicians always improvise with material, but the real essence of noise music is the character of the sounds, not their origins or material. Composing in advance for sound is a lot more difficult than traditional composing. Another result is that these noise musicians have extensive control of their instruments and can produce the sounds they wanted. They point out the importance of instruments that produce sound not directly controlled by themselves, something that create a musical quality that they aspire.

Persons : their identity and individuation

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.