Supervision as control system : the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument in the social services sector in Sweden

In this article, the prevailing official view of supervision as a regulatory instrument is examined as it applies to the social services sector in Sweden. The study is based on a comparison of the views expressed on the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument by two government commissions, the Supervision Commission and the Commission on Supervision within the Social Services (UTIS), and on the positions taken by the Government regarding the definitions of the concept of supervision proposed by these commissions. The view of supervision as a regulatory instrument expressed in these policy documents is analysed with the help of a theoretical framework describing the components, their functions and the governance characteristics of control systems. In the framework separate interrelated characteristics of the components are identified and summarized into two models of control systems. The analysis shows that supervision in the Swedish social services sector can be described in terms of both a disciplinary and non-disciplinary system. By its system theoretical basis and the identification of interrelated characteristics the study contributes to a broadened understanding of the construction and functions of supervision as a regulatory instrument and of how supervision within the Swedish social sector is meant to be designed.

Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Applicatiion of Almost ideal demand system for a pharmaceutical

This thesis is an application of the Almost Ideal Demand System approach of Deaton and Muellbauer,1980, for a particular pharmaceutical, Citalopram, in which GORMAN´s (1971) multi-stage budgeting approach is applied basically since it is one of the most useful approach in estimating demand for differentiated products. Citalopram is an antidepressant drug that is used in the treatment of major depression. As for most other pharmaceuticals whose the patent has expired, there exist branded and generic versions of Citalopram. This paper is aimed to define its demand system with two stage models for the branded version and five generic versions, and to show whether generic versions are able to compete with the branded version. I calculated the own price elasticities, and it made me possible to compare and make a conclusion about the consumers’ choices over the brand and generic drugs. Even though the models need for being developed with some additional variables, estimation results of models and uncompensated price elasticities indicated that the branded version has still power in the market, and generics are able to compete with lower prices. One important point that has to be taken into consideration is that the Swedish pharmaceutical market faced a reform on October 1, 2002, that aims to make consumer better informed about the price and decrease the overall expenditures for pharmaceuticals. Since there were not significantly enough generic sales to take into calculation before the reform, my paper covers sales after the reform.