Wickedness, Governance and Collective Sanctions: : Can Corruption be Tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Corruption, governance and collective sanctions: : can a wicked problem be tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Hårdare tag i arbetslivet? : Åtgärder mot arbetsrelaterat våld i facklig press 1978–2004

Preventing violence at work: A study of descriptions of safety measures in Swedish trade union journals 1978–2004 The purpose of this study is to examine if perceptions of interventions aimed at violence in the workplace have changed since the 1970s. In the beginning of the study period, structural factors are seen as the dominating explanation for workplace violence. The crime perspective rises in the 1990’s and methods of intervention becomes the control- and justice functions of larger society. The result shows search for accountability to be a salient factor for understanding the development towards an increasing use of penal sanctions.

Perceptions of the role of the man in family planning, during pregnancy and childbirth : A qualitative study with fifteen Nepali men

Introduction: In Nepal, by tradition, family life and marriage are generally controlled by patriarchal norms, sanctions, values and gender differences. Women in Nepal have limited possibilities to make decisions regarding their sexual and reproductive health, as the husbands and other elders in the family make most of the decisions regarding family planning, pregnancy and childbirth. Aim: To describe the perceptions of Nepali men regarding the role of the man with respect to family planning, pregnancy and childbirth. Methods: A qualitative study was conducted with 15 Nepali men in both urban and rural areas. The material was analyzed through inductive content analysis. Findings: One main category and two generic categories were identified. One generic category contained six subcategories and the other five subcategories. The main category was labeled: “He leads – She follows” and the generic categories were labeled: “Supporting women in family planning, during pregnancy and childbirth” and “Withdrawal from supporting women in family planning, during pregnancy and childbirth”. Conclusion: The role of the Nepali men with respect to family planning, pregnancy and childbirth, was identified as a conflicted approach. This study highlights the importance of understanding the influence of culture and tradition when developing strategies for promoting sexual and reproductive health during family planning, pregnancy and childbirth among families in Nepal.