Utmaningen från andra berättelser : En studie om moraliskt omdöme, utvidgat tänkande och kritiskt reflekterande berättelser i dialogbaserad feministisk etik

The present study has a threefold aim: First, the theoretical aim is to give a contribution to refinement of the theory of dialogue based feminist ethics, concerning the understanding of judgment and narration within such an ethics.  The study also has an empirical aim, defined as to clarify what kind of knowledge, relevant to the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor, can be received from dialogical interpretation and analysis of a limited selection of critically reflecting life stories. Third, a methodological aim is defined as to develop an approach to interpretation and analysis of reflecting life stories, which renders the storyteller visible as a reflecting moral subject, and makes the story accessible as a source of knowledge for the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor. The thesis combines philosophical reflection and argumentation, with a narrative-hermeneutic method for interpretation of life stories, relating the two to each other in a hermeneutic process.  The theoretical reflection draws on Seyla Benhabibs theory of communicative ethics. A dialogue based model for moral justification and a likewise dialogue based model for political legitimacy are at the heart of this universalistic theory, although in combination with a conception of a narratively and hermeneutically constituted context sensitive moral judgment, based on Hannah Arendt’s concept “enlarged thought”. In the reflection, this model is related to other feminist theorizing within the tradition of dialogue based feminist ethics, as found in the works of Iris M. Young, Georgia Warnke and Shari Stone-Mediatore. The empirical study draws on three critically reflecting life stories from Israeli-Palestinian women activists for a just peace. The methodology for interpretation and analysis that is worked out combines dialogical interpretation as presented in Arthur W. Frank’s socio-narratology with a method for structural analysis derived from Shari Stone-Mediatores theory of storytelling as an expression of political resistance struggle. The results show that some stories drawing on marginalized experiences have a potential­ to stimulate further public debate through their capacity to enable a stereoscopic seeing, elucidating a tension between ideologically structured discourse and non-linguistic experience; implying that narrative-hermeneutic competence should be considered crucial for public debate.  

Emotioner och värdegrundsarbete : Om lärare, fostran och elever i en mångkulturell skola

This thesis explores aspects of teachers’ obligation to implement and discuss what are referred to in the Swedish national school curricula as “fundamental values” (“värdegrunden” in Swedish). The aim is to describe and analyze dilemmas in interpretations of and teachers’ work with these fundamental values. Four questions are related to this aim. The first addresses difficulties discussed in conversations between seven upper secondary teachers, during nine meetings over the course of one year. In these conversations the teachers reflected upon how to interpret the fundamental values in relation to their daily practice. The second question focuses on the considerable diversity of Swedish schools and examines the work of the teachers through a perspective of intersectionality. The third question concerns how Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotions as judgments of value could be used for an understanding of the identified dilemmas. The fourth question focuses on ways in which the participating teachers’ discussions may contribute to a wider discussion about possible aims and circumstances of teachers’ work with the fundamental values. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) ethical thinking on emotions as judgments of value. She argues that emotions have four common cognitive components. They have (1) external objects, and are directed towards these objects. They are (2) intentional, reflecting a person’s particular point of view, his or her special way of beholding the object, and (3) consist of judgments, i.e. views of how things in the world are. According to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics, emotions also (4) mirror the individual’s vision of what a good human life is like, and the vulnerability of it. The concept of eudaimonia, a fulfilled or flourishing life, is central. Chapter 3 focuses on ideas of ethnicity, and on the specific obligation mentioned in the curriculum of counteracting xenophobia and intolerance in a multicultural society. Chapter 4 discusses various aspects of the teachers’ thoughts on religiosity within Swedish society (often depicted as one of most secular in the world) and within the educational system that is non-denominational. Chapter 5 draws attention to different ways in which the teachers view and teach pupils about sexual orientation. Chapter 6 presents conclusions on potential advantages of and challenges involved in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian theory of emotions, when applied to teachers’ views of and practical work with the fundamental values described in the curriculum. One advantage is that emotions may be intellectually scrutinized and morally assessed, on grounds that are known beforehand and discussed in a democratic process. The non-productive division between emotions, on the one hand, and intellectual and moral capabilities, on the other, is transcended by Nussbaum’s theory. An important challenge is to reflect upon when to discuss the cognitive content of pupils’ emotions, and when it is appropriate to state what is right or wrong, and try to influence pupils accordingly. Keywords: Emotions, vulnerability, values education, religious education, teaching, Martha Nussbaum, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation.

Critical anthropomorphism and animal ethics

Anthropomorphism has long been considered a cardinal error when describing animals. Ethicists have feared the consequences of misrepresenting animals in their reasoning. Recent research within human-animal studies, however, has sophisticated the notion of anthropomorphism. It is suggested that avoiding anthropomorphism merely creates other morphisms, such as mechanomorphism. Instead of avoiding anthropomorphism, it is argued that it is a communicative strategy that should be used critically. Instances of anthropomorphism in animal ethics are analyzed in this paper. Some analogies made between people and non-human animals in present theories of animal ethics are clear instances of psychological anthropomorphism. Other analogies are implicit cases of cultural anthropomorphism. It is argued that animal ethics needs to take the wider discourse of critical anthropomorphism into account in order to sophisticate the understanding and use of anthropomorphic projections. Anthropomorphism is an efficient tool of communication, and it may be made an adequate one as well.