Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

Livsfrågor och religionskunskap : En belysning av ett centralt begrepp i svensk religionsdidaktik

This thesis focuses on “livsfrågor” (questions of life) a typical Swedish concept introduced in the RE syllabus in the curriculum for compulsory schools in 1969. The study poses three questions: what can qualify as a “livsfråga”, why are they regarded important, and how do they fit into teaching? The main purpose is to study differences of the concept in two materials. Primarily interviews with Teacher educators all over Sweden and, secondly in the R.E. syllabus for compulsory and secondary schools from 1962 until today. Finally, the two materials used, will be brought together, and foci are recognized with the help of a tool for thought.  The study is using the concept dialogicity from Bachtin. Syllabus are viewed as compromises in accordance with a German tradition. In the syllabus, “livsfrågor” is one within many different words used with none what so ever stringency. It is not necessarily the most important term, as “livsåskådningsfrågor” (questions within philosophies of life)  is often dominating in objectivities. Also “existential questions” etc is used. The relation between the words are never made clear.  The syllabus are in one sense monologial as different meanings of the word are not made explicit, and other utterances are not invoked. In the interviews the dialogicity is more obvious. Philosophy is mentioned, eg.. Martin Buber, Viktor Frankl, theology (Paul Thillich), but also literature (Lars Gyllensten) and existentialism in a general sence. Other words are not as frequent – but “livsåskådningsfrågor” are of course mentioned, eg. Faith vs. knowledge. In the last chapter “livsfrågor” is problematized with the help of Andrew Wright and his three metanarrativies within the modern R.E. And the assumption, especially in the syllabus, of “livsfrågor”, as common between cultures and over time is problematized with the help of . feministic theory of knowledge.