Game Audio in Audio Games : Towards a Theory on the Roles and Functions of Sound in Audio Games

For the past few decades, researchers have increased our understanding of how sound functions within various audio–visual media formats. With a different focus in mind, this study aims to identify the roles and functions of sound in relation to the game form Audio Games, in order to explore the potential of sound when acting as an autonomous narrative form. Because this is still a relatively unexplored research field, the main purpose of this study is to help establish a theoretical ground and stimulate further research within the field of audio games. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the topic, this research relies on theoretical studies, examinations of audio games and contact with the audio game community. In order to reveal the roles of sound, the gathered data is analyzed according to both a contextual and a functional perspective. The research shows that a distinction between the terms ‘function’ and ‘role’ is important when analyzing sound in digital games. The analysis therefore results in the identification of two analytical levels that help define the functions and roles of an entity within a social context, named the Functional and the Interfunctional levels. In addition to successfully identifying three main roles of sound within audio games—each describing the relationship between sound and the entities game system, player and virtual environment—many other issues are also addressed. Consequently, and in accordance with its purpose, this study provides a broad foundation for further research of sound in both audio games and video games.

Persons : their identity and individuation

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.