Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

Självet, rollerna och pågående koordinationer av mänskliga handlingar : Om att försöka se ’samhället’ som något annat än fängelse eller marionetteater

The self, roles and the ongoing coordination of human action. Trying to see ‘society’ as neither prison nor puppet theatre In the article it is argued that structural North-American role-sociology may be integrated with theories emphasizing ‘society’ as ongoing processes (f. ex. Giddens’ theory of structuration). This is possible if the concept of role is defined as a recurrence oriented to the action of others standing out as a regularity in a societal process. But this definition makes it necessary to in a fundamental way understand what kind of social being the role-actor is. This is done with the help of Hans Joas’ theory of creativity and Merleau-Pontys concept of ‘flesh’ arguing that Meads concept of the ‘I’ maybe understood as an embodied self-asserting I, which at least in reflexive modernity has the creative power to split Meads ‘me’ into a self-voiced subject-me and an other voiced object-me. The embodied I communicating with the subject-me may be viewed as that role-actor which is something else than the role played. But this kind of role-actor is making for new troubles because it is hard to understand how this kind of self is creating self-coherence by using Meads concept of ‘the generalized other’. This trouble is handled by using Alain Touraines concept of the ‘subject’ and arguing that the generalized other is dissolving in de-modernized modernity. In split modernity self-coherence may instead be created by what in the article is called the generalized subject. This concept means a kind of communicative future based evaluation, which has its base in the ‘subject’ opposing the split powers of both the instrumentality of markets and of life-worlds trying to create ‘fundamentalistic’ self-identities. This kind of self is communicative because it also must respect the other as ‘subject’. It exists only in the battle against the forces of the market or a community. It never constructs an ideal city or a higher type of individual. It creates and protects a clearing that is constantly being invaded, to use the words of the old Frenchman himself. Asa kind of test-case it is by the way in the article shown how Becks concept of individualization may be understood in a deeply social and role-sociological way.