Den nya kassaregisterlagen

The government appointed in 2004 a special investigator with the objective to investigate the possibility of introducing a new law concerning implementation of obligatory cash registers with certain certification. This resulted in SOU 2005:35 ”Krav på kassaregister - Effektivare utredning av skattebrott” (Proposition 2006/07: 105). Following advice received from the respondents, the government has drafted a bill submitted to parliament in March 2007. Government bill 2006/07: 105 proposals for new law on cash registers, and submitted to parliament 2007th Act (2007:592) on the cash register was adopted by parliament in March that year and came into force on 1 January 2010. Earlier great opportunities for tax cheating has been available by various methods so as to simply not punch in a sale at the checkout, use the training function type, use receipt copies, manipulate register functions on its program level, using alternative programming etc. These opportunities are eliminated in the certified cash registers. Respondent traders believed the most part has not changed the competition or that the change will be relatively small. They also thought it was too early to see any change at this time. A tendency among traders we have asked is that they feel negatively for the costs it imposes, with the new registry and that they are skeptical about the expected impact of the law, among others due to the scarce resources spent on follow-up. The Swedish tax agency is responsible for control and the new systems make it easier for Tax control, but actual physical on-scene control must be performed to detect irregularities.

Education and Earnings for Poverty Reduction : Short-Term Evidence of Pro-Poor Growth from the Mexican Oportunidades Program

Education, as an indispensable component of human capital, has been acknowledged to play a critical role in economic growth, which is theoretically elaborated by human capital theory and empirically confirmed by evidence from different parts of the world. The educational impact on growth is especially valuable and meaningful when it is for the sake of poverty reduction and pro-poorness of growth. The paper re-explores the precious link between human capital development and poverty reduction by investigating the causal effect of education accumulation on earnings enhancement for anti-poverty and pro-poor growth. The analysis takes the evidence from a well-known conditional cash transfer (CCT) program — Oportunidades in Mexico. Aiming at alleviating poverty and promoting a better future by investing in human capital for children and youth in poverty, this CCT program has been recognized producing significant outcomes. The study investigates a short-term impact of education on earnings of the economically disadvantaged youth, taking the data of both the program’s treated and untreated youth from urban areas in Mexico from 2002 to 2004. Two econometric techniques, i.e. difference-in-differences and difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach are applied for estimation. The empirical analysis first identifies that youth who under the program’s schooling intervention possess an advantage in educational attainment over their non-intervention peers; with this identification of education discrepancy as a prerequisite, further results then present that earnings of the education advantaged youth increase at a higher rate about 20 percent than earnings of their education disadvantaged peers over the two years. This result indicates a confirmation that education accumulation for the economically disadvantaged young has a positive impact on their earnings enhancement and thus inferring a contribution to poverty reduction and pro-poorness of growth.

Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.