Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

Newly Automated System For Integrated Assessment Of The Conditions Of Underwater Gas Pipelines

An underwater gas pipeline is the portion of the pipeline that crosses a river beneath its bottom. Underwater gas pipelines are subject to increasing dangers as time goes by. An accident at an underwater gas pipeline can lead to technological and environmental disaster on the scale of an entire region. Therefore, timely troubleshooting of all underwater gas pipelines in order to prevent any potential accidents will remain a pressing task for the industry. The most important aspect of resolving this challenge is the quality of the automated system in question. Now the industry doesn't have any automated system that fully meets the needs of the experts working in the field maintaining underwater gas pipelines. Principle Aim of this Research: This work aims to develop a new system of automated monitoring which would simplify the process of evaluating the technical condition and decision making on planning and preventive maintenance and repair work on the underwater gas pipeline. Objectives: Creation a shared model for a new, automated system via IDEF3; Development of a new database system which would store all information about underwater gas pipelines; Development a new application that works with database servers, and provides an explanation of the results obtained from the server; Calculation of the values MTBF for specified pipelines based on quantitative data obtained from tests of this system. Conclusion: The new, automated system PodvodGazExpert has been developed for timely and qualitative determination of the physical conditions of underwater gas pipeline; The basis of the mathematical analysis of this new, automated system uses principal component analysis method; The process of determining the physical condition of an underwater gas pipeline with this new, automated system increases the MTBF by a factor of 8.18 above the existing system used today in the industry.