Gestion de la rareté de l’eau à Amman : rationnement de l’offre et pratiques des usagers

Notre article aborde la question du rationnement de l’offre d’eau potable dans la capitale jordanienne Amman. Il étudie la gestion publique-privée du rationnement, ainsi que ses impacts socio-économiques sur les usagers. Si 98 % de la population jordanienne jouit d’un raccordement au réseau d’eau potable, cet accès demeure assujetti à une intermittence en quantité et en qualité. Une situation expliquée par le discours gouvernemental, qui qualifie les villes du pays d’assoiffées, par la rareté hydrique et la croissance démographique. Or, l’étude du cas d’Amman, à travers la délégation, de 1999 à 2006, de la gestion du service au secteur privé, montre que le rationnement de l’offre incombe de façon importante à l’état technique du réseau défaillant, aggravé par les pratiques de connexions illégales et le gaspillage. Cet article met en outre l’accent sur les inégalités dans les usages de l’eau entre pauvres et riches, accrues par le rationnement inadapté aux caractéristiques socio-économiques des ménages. Ainsi, le coût des stratégies alternatives pour un accès adéquat à l’eau devient inabordable pour l’ensemble des familles, confrontées à une tarification progressive dont les effets sont pervers, et met en avant le rôle discriminatoire du revenu.

Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.

Protecting developing countries' forests: enforcement in theory and practice

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identify large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple tiers of enforcement and the incentives facing enforcement officers, and conflict between protected area managers and rural people's needs.