Ideational change in the WTO and its impacts on EU agricultural policy institutions and the CAP

This paper argues that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) introduced the market liberal paradigm as the ideational underpinning of the new farm trade regime. Though the immediate consequences in terms of limitations on agricultural support and protection were very modest, the Agreement did impact on the way in which domestic farm policy evolves. It forced EU agricultural policy makers to consider the agricultural negotiations when reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The new paradigm in global farm trade resulted in a process of institutional layering in which concerns raised in the World Trade Organization (WTO) were gradually incorporated in EU agricultural institutions. This has resulted in gradual reform of the CAP in which policy instruments have been changed in order to make the CAP more WTO compatible. The underlying paradigm, the state-assisted paradigm, has been sustained though it has been rephrased by introducing the concept of multifunctionality.

A new theory of educational change - punctuated equilibrium: the case of the internationalisation of Higher Education institutions

This article argues for a new theoretical paradigm for the analysis of change in educational institutions that is able to deal with such issues as readiness for change, transformational change and the failure of change strategies. Punctuated equilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) is a theory which has wide application. It envisages long-term change as being made up of a succession of long periods of relative stability interspersed by brief periods of rapid profound change. In the periods of stability only relatively small incremental changes are possible. The periods of transformational change may be triggered by external or internal influences. A recent study of the long-term process of internationalisation in higher education institutions shows evidence to support the theory: long periods of incremental change, events precipitating profound change and the failure of externally imposed attempts to change. Also, as the theory predicts, changes in collegial organisations are slower and more uncertain than changes in managed organisations.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.