Entre moralité et politique: l’éducation de Louis XV et la question de l’instruction financière du prince sous l’Ancien Régime

Studies on princely education rarely focus on the training received by future kings to perform one of their key functions – supervising the finances of the monarchy. Failure to address this issue is all the more surprising than one of the major consequences of Louis XIV’s coronation was to grant the king the direction of finances until the French Revolution, thus raising the issue of the financial education of the prince. Based on a largely unpublished body of primary sources, especially several manuscripts specifically written for the financial education of Louis XV and princes in the XVIIIth century, this article explores the teaching approaches and programme of a highly technical nature that the king’s tutors considered essential to the monarch’s duties.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.