The role of subsidy in ensuring the sustainability of small-scale anaerobic digesters in Odisha, India

Small-scale anaerobic digester installation has been a development objective of the Indian government to provide rural households clean fuel. Anaerobic digester installation is heavily subsidised. Depending on caste, the rate of subsidy offered for the smallest system available (1m3) varies between 32.35% and 41.18% of the total installation price. Yet, there are gaps in knowledge regarding the usefulness of such subsidies from a sustainability perspective. A cost-benefit analysis was conducted to evaluate the circumstances required for digester sustainability. The analysis used household data collected from 115 cattle owning households in Odisha, India to evaluate profitability at three levels of subsidy (none, General caste subsidy, and Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe subsidy). Additional analyses considered the effect of; taking a loan, replacing electric lighting with biogas lighting, and the wealth level of the household. The results indicated that access to subsidy improved profitability. Yet, profitability could be achieved without the use of subsidy. The level of benefit accrued by households was similar independent of wealth. However, the provision of subsidy was essential for ensuring profitability for those households required to take a loan to meet the expense of installation. Such findings highlight the importance of subsidy as a means of including the poor.

Saving the planet but losing the landscape: the impact of renewable energy policies on rural Britain

The main instrument of the Government's renewable energy policy is to promote wind power through regulation and subsidy. This gives rise to anomalies in rural planning when turbines are erected in sensitve areas in which other forms of development are strictly controlled. The situation is reviewed in the context of economic viability and considered also against the alternative of growing fuel crops. The latter are currently hampered by lack of Government support but could fulfil a useful secondary role of sustaining the agricultural sector and with it the management of lowland landscapes.

Inequalities in diet and nutrition

The inequality of nutrition and obesity re-focuses concern on who in society is consuming the worst diet. Identification of individuals with the worst of dietary habits permits for targeting interventions to assuage obesity among the population segment where it is most prevalent. We argue that the use of fiscal interventions does not appropriately take into account the economic, social and health circumstances of the intended beneficiaries of the policy. This paper reviews the influence of socio-demographic factors on nutrition and health status and considers the impacts of nutrition policy across the population drawing on methodologies from both public health and welfare economics. The effects of a fat tax on diet are found to be small and while other studies show that fat taxes saves lives, we show that average levels of disease risk do not change much: those consuming particularly bad diets continue to do so. Our results also suggest that the regressivity of the policy increases as the tax becomes focused on products with high saturated fat contents. A fiscally neutral policy that combines the fat tax with a subsidy on fruit and vegetables is actually more regressive because consumption of these foods tends to be concentrated in socially undeserving households. We argue that when inequality is of concern, population-based measures must reflect this and approaches that target vulnerable populations which have a shared propensity to adopt unhealthy behaviours are appropriate.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplusfrom consumersand taxpayers to farmers.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

An analysis of UK policies for domestic energy reduction using an agent based tool

This paper introduces a new agent-based model, which incorporates the actions of individual homeowners in a long-term domestic stock model, and details how it was applied in energy policy analysis. The results indicate that current policies are likely to fall significantly short of the 80% target and suggest that current subsidy levels need re-examining. In the model, current subsidy levels appear to offer too much support to some technologies, which in turn leads to the suppression of other technologies that have a greater energy saving potential. The model can be used by policy makers to develop further scenarios to find alternative, more effective, sets of policy measures. The model is currently limited to the owner-occupied stock in England, although it can be expanded, subject to the availability of data.

The distributional consequences of a fiscal food policy: evidence from the UK

The literature on fiscal food policies focuses on their effectiveness in altering diets and improving health, while this paper focuses on their welfare costs. A formal welfare economics framework is developed to calculate the combined individualistic and distributional impacts of a tax-subsidy. Distributional characteristics of foods targeted by a tax tend to be concentrated in lower-income households. Further, consumption of fruit and vegetables tends to be concentrated in higher-income households; therefore, a subsidy on such foods increases regressivity. Aggregate welfare changes that result from a fiscal food policy are found to range from an increase of 1.41 per cent to a reduction of 2.06 per cent according to whether a subsidy is included, the degree of inequality aversion, and whether substitution among foods is allowed.