Ethnobiology and the evolution of the human mind

An evolutionary perspective on human thought and behaviour indicates that we should expect to find universal systems of perception, classification, and decision-making regarding the natural world. It is the interaction between these evolved aspects of the human mind, the biodiversity of the natural world, and unique historical, social, and economic contexts within which individuals develop and act that gives rise to cultural diversity. The palaeoanthropological record also indicates that language is a recently evolved phenomenon. This suggests that linguistic approaches in ethnobiology are likely to provide only a partial understanding of how humans perceive, classify, and engage with the natural world.

Modeling infant speech sound discrimination using simple associative networks

Infants' responses in speech sound discrimination tasks can be nonmonotonic over time. Stager and Werker (1997) reported such data in a bimodal habituation task. In this task, 8-month-old infants were capable of discriminations that involved minimal contrast pairs, whereas 14-month-old infants were not. It was argued that the older infants' attenuated performance was linked to their processing of the stimuli for meaning. The authors suggested that these data are diagnostic of a qualitative shift in infant cognition. We describe an associative connectionist model showing a similar decrement in discrimination without any qualitative shift in processing. The model suggests that responses to phonemic contrasts may be a nonmonotonic function of experience with language. The implications of this idea are discussed. The model also provides a formal framework for studying habituation-dishabituation behaviors in infancy.

Changing state disruption of lip-reading by irrelevant sound in perceptual and memory tasks

Three experiments investigated irrelevant sound interference of lip-read lists. In Experiment 1, an acoustically changing sequence of nine irrelevant utterances was more disruptive to spoken immediate identification of lists of nine lip-read digits than nine repetitions of the same utterances (the changing-state effect; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992). Experiment 2 replicated this finding when lip-read items were sampled with replacement from the nine digits to form the lip-read lists. In Experiment 3, when the irrelevant sound was confined to the retention interval of a delayed recall task, a changing-state pattern of disruption also occurred. Results confirm a changing-state effect in memory for lip-read items but also point to the possibility that, for lip-reading, changing-state effects may occur at an earlier, perceptual stage.

Auditory memory and the irrelevant sound effect: further evidence for changing state disruption

Four experiments investigate the hypothesis that irrelevant sound interferes with serial recall of auditory items in the same fashion as with visually presented items. In Experiment 1 an acoustically changing sequence of 30 irrelevant utterances was more disruptive than 30 repetitions of the same utterance (the changing-state effect; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992) whether the to-be-remembered items were visually or auditorily presented. Experiment 2 showed that two different utterances spoken once (a heterogeneous compound suffix; LeCompte & Watkins, 1995) produced less disruption to serial recall than 15 repetitions of the same sequence. Disruption thus depends on the number of sounds in the irrelevant sequence. In Experiments 3a and 3b the number of different sounds, the "token-set" size (Tremblay & Jones, 1998), in an irrelevant sequence also influenced the magnitude of disruption in both irrelevant sound and compound suffix conditions. The results support the view that the disruption of memory for auditory items, like memory for visually presented items, is dependent on the number of different irrelevant sounds presented and the size of the set from which these sounds are taken. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Self-defence: A state of mind for states?

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.