Deficits in agency in schizophrenia, and additional deficits in body image, body schema, and internal timing, in passivity symptoms

Individuals with schizophrenia, particularly those with passivity symptoms, may not feel in control of their actions, believing them to be controlled by external agents. Cognitive operations that contribute to these symptoms may include abnormal processing in agency as well as body representations that deal with body schema and body image. However, these operations in schizophrenia are not fully understood, and the questions of general versus specific deficits in individuals with different symptom profiles remain unanswered. Using the projected-hand illusion (a digital video version of the rubber-hand illusion) with synchronous and asynchronous stroking (500 ms delay), and a hand laterality judgment task, we assessed sense of agency, body image, and body schema in 53 people with clinically stable schizophrenia (with a current, past, and no history of passivity symptoms) and 48 healthy controls. The results revealed a stable trait in schizophrenia with no difference between clinical subgroups (sense of agency) and some quantitative (specific) differences depending on the passivity symptom profile (body image and body schema). Specifically, a reduced sense of self-agency was a common feature of all clinical subgroups. However, subgroup comparisons showed that individuals with passivity symptoms (both current and past) had significantly greater deficits on tasks assessing body image and body schema, relative to the other groups. In addition, patients with current passivity symptoms failed to demonstrate the normal reduction in body illusion typically seen with a 500 ms delay in visual feedback (asynchronous condition), suggesting internal timing problems. Altogether, the results underscore self-abnormalities in schizophrenia, provide evidence for both trait abnormalities and state changes specific to passivity symptoms, and point to a role for internal timing deficits as a mechanistic explanation for external cues becoming a possible source of self-body input.

Immunogenetics of drug-induced skin blistering disorders. Part I: Perspective

The overall immunopathogenesis relevant to a large series of disorders caused by a drug or its associated hyperimmune condition is discussed based upon the examination of the genetics of severe drug-induced bullous skin problems (sporadic idiosyncratic adverse events, including Stevens-Johnson syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis). An overarching pharmacogenetic schema is proposed. Immune cognition and early-effector processes are focused upon and a challenging synthesis around systems evolution is explained by a variety of projective analogies. Etiology, human leukocyte antigen-B, immune stability, clysiregulation, pharmacomimicry, viruses and an aggressive ethnically differentiated 'karmic' response are discussed.

Minimising the latency induced by consistency control, within a large scale multi-user distributed virtual reality system

Where users are interacting in a distributed virtual environment, the actions of each user must be observed by peers with sufficient consistency and within a limited delay so as not to be detrimental to the interaction. The consistency control issue may be split into three parts: update control; consistent enactment and evolution of events; and causal consistency. The delay in the presentation of events, termed latency, is primarily dependent on the network propagation delay and the consistency control algorithms. The latency induced by the consistency control algorithm, in particular causal ordering, is proportional to the number of participants. This paper describes how the effect of network delays may be reduced and introduces a scalable solution that provides sufficient consistency control while minimising its effect on latency. The principles described have been developed at Reading over the past five years. Similar principles are now emerging in the simulation community through the HLA standard. This paper attempts to validate the suggested principles within the schema of distributed simulation and virtual environments and to compare and contrast with those described by the HLA definition documents.

Output envelope adjustment for an environmental fuzzy logic controller

A two-level fuzzy logic controller for use in air-conditioning systems is outlined in this paper. At the first level a simplified controller is produced from expert knowledge and envelope adjustment is introduced, while the second level provides a means for adapting this controller to different working spaces. The mechanism for adaption is easily implemented and can be used in real time. A series of simulations is presented to illustrate the proposed schema.

The brain’s fingers and hands

The brain keeps track of the changing positions of body parts in space using a spatial body schema. When subjects localise a tactile stimulus on the skin, they might either use a somatotopic body map, or use a body schema to identify the location of the stimulation in external space. Healthy subjects were touched on the fingertips, with the hands in one of two postures: either the right hand was vertically above the left, or the fingers of both hands were interwoven. Subjects made speeded verbal responses to identify either the finger or the hand that was touched. Interweaving the fingers significantly impaired hand identification across several experiments, but had no effect on finger identification. Our results suggest that identification of fingers occurs in a somatotopic representation or finger schema. Identification of hands uses a general body schema, and is influenced by external spatial location. This dissociation implies that touches on the finger can only be identified with a particular hand after a process of assigning fingers to hands. This assignment is based on external spatial location. Our results suggest a role of the body schema in the identification of structural body parts from touch.

Cognitive and bodily selves: how do they interact following brain lesion?

Dualism has long distinguished between the mental and the body experiences. Probing the structure and organisation of the self traditionally calls for a distinction between these two sides of the self coin. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to address these philosophical issues, and our starting point will be the simple distinction between reflective processes involved in the elaboration of body image, self awareness and self-recognition (i.e. ‘the self’) and the sensori-motor dialogues involved in action control, reactions and automatisms (i.e. ‘the body’ schema). This oversimplification does not take into account the complex interactions taking place between these two levels of description, but our initial aim will be to distinguish between them, before addressing the question of their interactions. Cognitive and sensori-motor processes have frequently been distinguished (review: Rossetti and Revonsuo 2000), and it may be proposed that a similar dissociation can be put forward, a priori, between a central representation of self and a bodily representation corresponding to body schema (Figure 1).

A matter of choice: strategy and discretion in the shadow of World War Two

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America’s war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America’s choices today.

The metaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism

In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.