Republicanism, rights and democratic Athens

Cartledge and Edge (2010) argue that the modern republican tradition offers a useful framework for understanding the Athenian concept of freedom; and that within this framework the Athenians protected their freedoms without reference to any concept of rights. This paper agrees with both of these conclusions but identifies and corrects three assumptions behind Cartledge and Edge’s argument: that the only purpose of rights is to protect individual freedoms against the state; that rights have no place at all in the republican tradition; and that the ancient Greeks did not understand rights. In fact the Athenians did have an understanding of rights but they did not use rights to protect freedoms. The reason for this is that the protected freedom is a very modern and particularly sophisticated application of the concept of rights.

Legitimacy and rights in the EU: questions of identity

Rights as well as democracy play a crucial role in the legitimacy of the EU and constitutional patriotism has been influential in attempting to link them together. The article seeks to engage in a critique of constitutional patriotism on two fronts. First, it distinguishes between the various types of right that exist within EU law-Community, citizenship and fundamental-and then analyses the place of these rights within various political models of the EU ranging from nationalism to republicanism. It argues that constitutional patriotism does not enjoy a monopoly on rights discourse in the EU: most models of the EU see a place for rights; it is just that the type of right supported varies. Secondly, advocates of constitutional patriotism argue that EU rights generate European identity. The article questions the extent to which this is the case, arguing that identity potential varies considerably according to the type of EU right concerned.

Medusa, Antaeus, and Caesar Libycus

Although it is well known that Lucan’s Libya is a wild and threatening place, its threat is not restricted to indigenous people, places and things, such as Hannibal, Cleopatra, the Syrtes, or the desert with its catalogue of horrifying snakes. He also associates Libya with anti-Republican Romans, above all Julius Caesar, who endangers the Republic with his excessive, animalistic energy and resembles the continent where he is trapped in the final book. Although the gods as characters are removed from the world of the Bellum Civile, Lucan allows supernatural traces to linger in particular locations such as the Gallic grove in Book 3 or Thessaly in Book 6. Libya is by far the greatest of these reservoirs of frightening myth and fantasy, which do violence to the historical credibility of the narrative, just as Libya itself is presented as the origin or conduit of a number of historical characters who assault Italy and Europe. Lucan’s two mythic narratives (Antaeus in Book 4 and Medusa in Book 9) are essential parts of the hostile Libyan landscape, but in very different ways. The male Antaeus, associated with lions, is connected with a region of solid rock where he was destroyed. The female Medusa, associated with snakes, is connected with a region of shifting sands where she left a deadly, everlasting legacy. To complicate matters further, even though Medusa’s snakes represent the annihilation of the Republican self, the logic of the narrative is undermined and there is even a sympathetic subtext. As part of Libya’s historical and mythical legacy, these stories reveal that for Lucan, historical epic is linked with Republicanism, but mythical epic is in the service of dictatorship.

Harringtonian virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the method of the 'Moment'

This article presents a reinterpretation of James Harrington's writings. It takes issue with J. G. A. Pocock's reading, which treats him as importing into England a Machiavellian ‘language of political thought’. This reading is the basis of Pocock's stress on the republicanism of eighteenth-century opposition values. Harrington's writings were in fact a most implausible channel for such ideas. His outlook owed much to Stoicism. Unlike the Florentine, he admired the contemplative life; was sympathetic to commerce; and was relaxed about the threat of ‘corruption’ (a concept that he did not understand). These views can be associated with his apparent aims: the preservation of a national church with a salaried but politically impotent clergy; and the restoration of the royalist gentry to a leading role in English politics. Pocock's hypothesis is shown to be conditioned by his method; its weaknesses reflect some difficulties inherent in the notion of ‘languages of thought’.

Sparta and the English Republic

In 1659-60, James Harrington and Henry Stubbe, two republican authors, engaged in a bad-tempered pamphlet debate about the constitution of classical Sparta. This took place in the context of political collapse after the fall of the Cromwellian Protectorate, as republicans desperately attempted to devise safeguards which could prevent the return of monarchy. Questions of constitutional form were not always at the forefront of 1650s English republicanism, but Harrington’s ideal constitution of ‘Oceana’ brought these questions to the fore in 1659’s discussions. Sparta formed a key plank of the ‘ancient prudence’ which supported Harrington’s theory, and like Stubbe he drew on Nicolaus Cragius’ De Republica Lacedaemoniorum (1593) for evidence, and was attracted to some of the more apparently ‘aristocratic’ elements of the Spartan constitution. However, classical texts and modern scholarly authority, such as Cragius’, were not the only ingredients in the English version of the ‘classical republican’ tradition; sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political thinkers and current exigencies also shaped Harrington and Stubbe’s arguments. Both Harrington and Stubbe ended up challenging the scholarly and ancient consensus that Sparta was an aristocracy or mixed polity, Harrington reinterpreting it to assimilate it to ‘democracy’, and Stubbe attempting to rehabilitate a model of benign ‘oligarchy’.

Varieties of parliamentarianism

From the start of the English civil war, the parliamentarians were a fragmented coalition, held together by distrust of the king and a belief that Parliament was entitled to lead action to remedy his government’s deficiencies. The driving motivations of parliamentarians were various, including the religious commitments of puritanism, legalistic thought about the ancient constitution, and more radical notions of republicanism or natural rights. Historians have disputed whether parliamentarianism had an inherent strand of radicalism – or radical potential – from the early 1640s, but radicalization certainly took place as the civil wars went on, alongside more ‘conservative’ reactions against the propaganda and wartime measures employed by parliament. Parliamentarian radicalism itself was varied in character, embracing the Levellers’ populism, parliamentary absolutism, and millenarian and providentialist ideas.