Technological innovation in the context of PPPs: incentives, opportunities and actions

From a construction perspective, Public-Private Partnership projects (PPPs) are often credited as providing real incentives for the actors involved as well as a business environment that is conducive to innovation and improved practices. The validity of four common rhetorical arguments used to promote the PPP procurement route is explored: collaborative working, design freedom, long-term commitment and risk transfer. Particular interest is given to the extent to which espoused intentions correlate with experienced realities in allowing actors involved in the design and construction phases to be presented with, and able to exploit, opportunities for technological innovation. It is argued that there is reason to be cautious in fully accepting the purported benefits of the PPP framework and that the arguments often presented need to be revised. Alternative interpretations are provided.

Contracts and incentives in the construction sector

The aim of this chapter is to examine what the construction sector brings to our understanding of the procurement of complex performance. The chapter is divided into the following parts: fi rst, an overview of the various matters that contribute to the complexity of construction procurement is provided. Second, the most important contractual incentive schemes found in construction contracts are discussed, and this is followed by, third, an examination of the changes associated with the shift towards procuring complex performance (PCP) (service provision). Fourth, the main findings of the authors’ recent research on PCP contracts are summarised, followed by the conclusion. It should be noted that the procurement of services is referred to as ‘PCP’ in this chapter.

New evidence on the green building rent and price premium

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary eco-certification on the rental and sale prices of US commercial office properties. Hedonic and logistic regressions are used to test whether there are rental and sale price premiums for LEED and Energy Star certified buildings. The results of the hedonic analysis suggest that there is a rental premium of approximately 6% for LEED and Energy Star certification. A sale price premium of approximately 35% was found for 127 price observations involving LEED rated buildings and 31% for 662 buildings involving Energy Star rated buildings. When compared to samples of similar buildings identified by a binomial logistic regression for LEED-certified buildings, the existence of a rent and sales price premium is confirmed albeit with differences regarding the magnitude of the premium. Overall, the results of this study confirm that LEED and Energy Star buildings exhibit higher rental rates and sales prices per square foot controlling for a large number of location- and property-specific factors.

Lease maturity and initial rent: is there a term structure for UK commercial property leases?

This paper investigates the relationship between lease maturity and rent in commercial property. Over the last decade market-led changes to lease structures, the threat of government intervention and the associated emergence of the Codes of Practice for commercial leases have stimulated growing interest in pricing of commercial property leases. Seminal work by Grenadier (1995) derived a set of hypotheses about the pricing of different lease lengths in different market conditions. Whilst there is a compelling theoretical case for and a strong intuitive expectation of differential pricing of different lease maturities, to date the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Two Swedish studies have found mixed results (Gunnelin and Soderbergh 2003 and Englund et al 2003). In only half the cases is the null hypothesis that lease length has no effect rejected. In the UK, Crosby et al (2003) report counterintuitive results. In some markets, they find that short lease terms are associated with low rents, whilst in others they are associated with high rents. Drawing upon a substantial database of commercial lettings in central London (West End and City of London) over the last decade, we investigate the relationship between rent and lease maturity. In particular, we test whether a building quality variable omitted in previous studies provides empirical results that are more consistent with the theoretical and intuitive a priori expectations. It is found that initial leases rates are upward sloping with the lease term and that this relationship is constant over time.

Are property agents to blame for upward only rent reviews?

In negotiating commercial leases, many landlords and tenants employ property agents (brokers) to act on their behalf; typically these people are chartered surveyors. The aim of this paper is to explore the role that these brokers play in the shaping of commercial leases in the context of the current debate in the UK on upward only rent reviews. This role can be described using agency theory and the theories of professionalism. These provide expectations of behaviour which show inherent tensions between the role of agent and professional, particularly regarding the use of knowledge, autonomy and the obligation to the public interest. The parties to eleven recent lease transactions were interviewed to see if the brokers conformed to the expectations of agency theory or professionalism. Brokers that acted for industrial and office tenants behaved as professionals in using their expertise to determine lease structures. However, those acting for landlords and retail tenants simply followed instructions and behaved as conduits for their clients, a role more usually associated with that of an agent within the principal-agent relationship. None of the landlords’ brokers saw themselves as having responsibilities beyond their clients and so they were not promoting the discussion of alternatives to the UORR. The evidence from these case studies suggests that agents are not professionals; to behave entirely as an agent is to contradict the essential characteristics of a professional. While brokers cannot be held entirely responsible for the lack of movement on the UORR, by adopting predominantly agent roles then they must take some of the blame. However, behind this may be a much larger issue that needs to be explored; the institutional pressures that lead to professionals behaving in this way.

Sustainable building certification and the rent premium: a panel data approach

This paper investigates whether obtaining sustainable building certification entails a rental premium for commercial office buildings and tracks its development over time. To this aim, both a difference-in-differences and a fixed-effects model approach are applied to a large panel dataset of office buildings in the United States in the 2000–2010 period. The results indicate a significant rental premium for both ENERGY STAR and LEED certified buildings. Controlling for confounding factors, this premium is shown to have increased steadily from 2006 to 2008, followed by a moderate decline in the subsequent periods. The results also show a significant positive relationship between ENERGY STAR labeling and building occupancy rates.

The impact of energy performance certificates on the rental and capital values of commercial property assets: some preliminary evidence from the UK

This paper focuses on the effect of energy performance ratings on the capital values, rental values and equivalent yields of UK commercial property assets. Of which a small number are also BREEAM rated, the study is based upon 708 commercial property assets held in the IPD UK Universe drawn from across all PAS segments. Incorporating a range of controls such as unexpired lease term, vacancy rate and tenant credit risk, hedonic regression procedures are used to estimate the effect of EPC rating. The study finds no evidence of a strong relationship between environmental and/or energy performance and rental and capital value. Bearing in mind the small number of BREEAM rated assets, there was a small but statistically significant effect on equivalent yield only. Similarly, there was no evidence that the EPC rating had any effect on Market Rent or Market Value with only minor effects of EPC ratings on equivalent yields. The preliminary conclusion is that energy labelling is not yet having the effects on Market Values and Market Rents that provide incentives for market participants to improve the energy efficiency of their commercial real estate assets.

Office rent determinants: a hedonic panel analysis

It has been frequently observed that office markets are subject to particularly high fluctuations in rents and vacancy levels, thus exposing real estate investors to considerable risk regarding expected future income streams. This paper analyzes the determinants of office rents and their variability over time and across sub-markets to gain insight into the rent price formation and its stability across space and over time. No support is found for the single-market hypothesis which states that arbitrage opportunities effectively align real estate pricing schemes in various parts of city. Instead, the results suggest that the importance of hedonic pricing factors varies both over time and across submarkets.

Are local economic development incentives promoting job growth? An empirical case study

At a time when cities are competing with one another to attract or retain jobs within a globalizing economy, city governments are providing an array of financial incentives to stimulate job growth and retain existing jobs, particularly in high cost locations. This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of datasets on economic development incentives in New York City over the last fifteen years. The evidence on job retention and creation is mixed. Although many companies do not meet their agreed-upon job targets in absolute terms, the evidence suggests that companies receiving subsidies outperform their respective industries in terms of employment growth, that is, the grow more, or decline less. We emphasize that this finding is difficult to interpret, since firms receiving incentives may not be representative of the industry as a whole. In other words, their above-average performance may simply reflect the fact that the Economic Development Corporation (EDC) selects economically promising companies within manufacturing (or other industries) when granting incentives. At the same time, it is also possible that receiving incentives helps these companies to become stronger.