Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz’s interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz’s definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations – a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.

Remote law-making? American drone strikes and the development of jus ad bellum

There is growing concern amongst international lawyers that the United States’ use of unmanned armed vehicles to conduct lethal targeting operations against non-state actors is setting a dangerous precedent for the future and might lead to an erosion of important rules under international law. Taking seriously these concerns, this article examines in more detail the potential precedent created by the US through its lethal drone strikes and the provided justifications, for the purpose of the development of jus ad bellum. In identifying the claims made by the US under different theories of customary international law as qualified practice or expressions of opinio juris that can lead to an alteration of the law should they be accepted by the international community, this article takes a first step towards a more extensive debate on the potential effects of the US drone strikes on the development of international law.