Recreational access to private land in England and Wales: public good; private interest

Since the Eighteenth Century the protection of public recreational access to private land has been maintained by the state through a mixture of legal rights of passage and the safeguarding of certain de facto access rights. While this situation has been modified in the last fifty years to facilitate some formalisation of access arrangements and landowner compensation in areas of high recreational pressure and low legal accessibility, recent policies indicate that a shift from public to private rights is underway. At the core of this paradigm shift are the new access payment schemes introduced as part of the restructuring of the European Common Agricultural Policy. Under these schemes landowners are now paid for 'supplying' recreational access, with the state, as the former upholder of citizen rights, now assuming the duplicitous position of further underwriting private property ownership through the effective commodification of access, while simultaneously proclaiming significant improvements in citizens' access rights.

Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision

People contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

Patents and transgenic plants

One of the recurring themes in any discussion concerning the application of genetic transformation technology is the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). This term covers both the content of patents and the confidential expertise, usually related to methodology and referred to as “Trade Secrets”. This review will explain the concepts behind patent protection, and will discuss the wide-ranging scope of existing patents that cover all aspects of transgenic technology, from selectable markers and novel promoters to methods of gene introduction. Although few of these patents have any significant commercial value, there are a small number of key patents that may restrict the “freedom to operate” of any company seeking to exploit the methods. Over the last twenty years, these restrictions have forced extensive cross-licensing between ag-biotech companies and have been one of the driving forces behind the consolidation of these companies. Although such issues are often considered to be of little interest to the academic scientist working in the public sector, they are of great importance in any debate about the role of “public-good breeding” and of the relationship between the public and private sectors.

Review: intellectual property aspects of plant transformation

One of the recurring themes of the debates concerning the application of genetic transformation technology has been the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). This term covers both the content of patents and the confidential expertise usually related to methodology and referred to as 'Trade Secrets'. This review explains the concepts behind patent protection, and discusses the wide-ranging scope of existing patents that cover all aspects of transgenic technology, from selectable markers and novel promoters to methods of gene introduction. Although few of the patents in this area have any real commercial value, there are a small number of key patents that restrict the 'freedom to operate' of new companies seeking to exploit the methods. Over the last 20 years, these restrictions have forced extensive cross-licensing between ag-biotech companies and have been one of the driving forces behind the consolidation of these companies. Although such issues are often considered of little interest to the academic scientist working in the public sector, they are of great importance in any discussion of the role of 'public-good breeding' and of the relationship between the public and private sectors.

Patents for plants: context and current status

One of the important themes in any discussion concerning the application of genetic transformation technology in horticulture or elsewhere is the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). This term covers both the content of patents and the confidential expertise, usually related to methodology and referred to as “Trade Secrets”. This review will explain the concepts behind patent protection, and will discuss the wide-ranging scope of existing patents that cover novel genotypes of plants as well as all aspects of transgenic technology, from selectable markers and novel promoters to methods of gene introduction. Although few of these patents have any significant commercial value there are a small number of key patents that may restrict the “freedom to operate” of any company seeking to exploit the methods in the production of transgenic varieties. Over the last twenty years, these restrictions have forced extensive cross-licensing between ag-biotech companies and have been one of the driving forces behind the consolidation of these companies. Although such issues may have limited relevance in the horticultural sector, and are often considered to be of little interest to the academic scientist working in the public sector, they are of great importance in any debate about the role of “public-good breeding” and of the relationship between the public and private sectors.

Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America

This paper has two principal aims: first, to unravel some of the arguments mobilized in the controversial privatization debate, and second, to review the scale and nature of private sector provision of water and sanitation in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Despite being vigorously promoted in the policy arena and having been implemented in several countries in the South in the 1990s, privatization has achieved neither the scale nor benefits anticipated. In particular, the paper is pessimistic about the role that privatization can play in achieving the Millennium Development Goals of halving the number of people without access to water and sanitation by 2015. This is not because of some inherent contradiction between private profits and the public good, but because neither publicly nor privately operated utilities are well suited to serving the majority of low-income households with inadequate water and sanitation, and because many of the barriers to service provision in poor settlements can persist whether water and sanitation utilities are publicly or privately operated. This is not to say that well-governed localities should not choose to involve private companies in water and sanitation provision, but it does imply that there is no justification for international agencies and agreements to actively promote greater private sector participation on the grounds that it can significantly reduce deficiencies in water and sanitation services in the South.

Economic rationale for interventions to control livestock disease

Disease in farm animals has significant economic impacts on livestock production and incurs substantial costs for societies. Impacts affect not only livestock farms and the livestock industries but also sectors outside of farming. Important negative externalities of livestock disease include impacts on the health of other producers’ livestock, on human health, and on animal welfare. Good disease risk management/biosecurity and good animal welfare are public goods. Not taking account of these externality and public good aspects can lead to a misallocation of resources for livestock disease control. In such instances, there may be a strong case for government or other authority to intervene to ensure a better use of resources. There are a number of policy instruments that can be implemented for this purpose. One potential instrument is a Farm Animal Health and Welfare Stewardship Scheme funded under Pillar II of the CAP. A number of countries have public–private partnership cost-sharing schemes that aim to share appropriately both responsibilities and costs of epidemic livestock disease. There is a strong future agenda for appropriate intervention by governments in the management of livestock disease risks, including responsibility and cost sharing for livestock disease control, within the European Union and elsewhere.

The researcher-farmer interface in the rice-wheat system: moving from agricultural productivity to livelihoods

This chapter explores some of the implications of adopting a research approach that focuses on people and their livelihoods in the rice-wheat system of the Indo-Gangetic Plains. We draw on information from a study undertaken by the authors in Bangladesh and then consider the transferability of our findings to other situations. We conclude that if our research is to bridge the researcher-farmer interface, ongoing technical research must be supported by research that explores how institutional, policy, and communication strategies determine livelihood outcomes. The challenge that now faces researchers is to move beyond their involvement in participatory research to understand how to facilitate a process in which they provide information and products for others to test. Building capacity at various levels for openness in sharing information and products–seeing research as a public good for all–seems to be a prerequisite for more effective dissemination of the available information and technologies.

Control without deception

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others' behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.

Chronic limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and oligopolistic markets: an urgent case for socialized capital

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the serious limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and urge for a shift to socialized capital before further economic deterioration leads to a succession of global conflicts. Design/methodology/approach – This conceptual paper adopts a macro perspective in presenting argument on how global, financial markets integration and capital flow liberalization have led to inadequate market and corporate governance measures. The argument is couched in a selected literature and is preceded by a proposed solution – the requirement for socialized capital. An analysis of the nature of socialized capital is outlined and the questions that require attention identified if a paradigm shift from neo-liberal capitalism is to take place. Findings – The need to urgently shift to a new philosophy of capitalism is overwhelming. Emphasized is that capital needs to adopt a socialised identity and is supported by investment horizons of 30 years or more. It is argued that non-market (e.g. state, NGOs, civil society) intervention is critical in setting appropriate frameworks within which socialized capital can operate. Research limitations/implications – This is a theoretical paper, in which questions are raised which require transparent, public debate. Originality/value – The paper presents the case for a fundamental reconsideration of present day markets, the role of capital and the influence of elites in determining the public good.

Multi-criteria analysis and the resolution of sustainable development dilemmas: a stakeholder management approach

We demonstrate that stakeholder-oriented multi-criteria analysis (MCA) can adequately address a variety of sustainable development dilemmas in decision-making, especially when applied to complex project evaluations involving multiple objectives and multiple stakeholder groups. Such evaluations are typically geared towards satisfying simultaneously private economic goals, broader social objectives and environmental targets. We show that, under specific conditions, a variety of stakeholder-oriented MCA approaches may be able to contribute substantively to the resolution or improved governance of societal conflicts and the pursuit of the public good in the form of sustainable development. We contrast the potential usefulness of these stakeholder-oriented approaches – in terms of their ability to contribute to sustainable development – with more conventional MCA approaches and social cost–benefit analysis.

Good machine performance in Turing’s imitation game

In this paper we consider transcripts which originated from a practical series of Turing’s Imitation Game which was held on 23rd June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. In some cases the tests involved a 3-participant simultaneous comparison of two hidden entities whereas others were the result of a direct 2-participant interaction. Each of the transcripts considered here resulted in a human interrogator being fooled, by a machine, into concluding that they had been conversing with a human. Particular features of the conversation are highlighted, successful ploys on the part of each machine discussed and likely reasons for the interrogator being fooled are considered. Subsequent feedback from the interrogators involved is also included