A paradoxical presidency: Nicolas Sarkozy, 2007-2012

The Sarkozy presidency is shot through with paradox and contrast: between a well-elected president swiftly loathed by most voters; a ‘hyper-president’ who probably weakened the office; a talented party leader who lost effective control of his party; a right-wing president who was readily compared to Tony Blair; and an ambitious reformer who promised a clean break with the indecision of his two predecessors but whose record was more timid than his rhetoric. This article interprets Sarkozy’s record in the context of the presidential office, the specific circumstances of his presidency, and of the president’s own personality, skills and shortcomings.

The President above parties: a founding illusion of the Fifth Republic

De Gaulle, founder of the Fifth French Republic, cherished the notion that the president of the Republic could somehow stand above party politics. In many ways this belief shaped the early institutional configuration of the new Republic. Party politics, however, rapidly reached the presidency, especially with the move, under the constitutional reform of 1962, to direct election of the president. This article charts the development of France's 'political constitution' and the relationship between president and parties over the first decade of the Fifth Republic. It finds that although the presidency became the prime goal of party political competition, the (often dysfunctional) illusion of a head of state above politics continues to shape the behaviour and perceptions of French presidents.

Surviving without leading: Jacques Chirac

The presidency of Jacques Chirac in France (1995-2007) was scarred by two crushing defeats: the parliamentary elections of 25 May and 1 June 1997, and the referendum on the European Constitution of 29 May 2005. As both were highly personal setbacks, since both votes were taken at Chirac’s initiative they suggest that a dominant presidential position, twice won, was twice squandered owing to a failure of leadership. This chapter argues, firstly, that the weaknesses of the presidency arose chiefly from the three decades of Chirac’s career before the 1995 election – and, secondly, that Chirac’s record of presidential leadership, though limited, is more substantial than these two major failures suggest.