The politics of temporary work deregulation in Europe: solving the French puzzle

Temporary work has expanded in the last three decades with adverse implications for inequalities. Because temporary workers are a constituency that is unlikely to impose political costs, governments often choose to reduce temporary work regulations. While most European countries have indeed implemented such reforms, France went in the opposite direction, despite having both rigid labour markets and high unemployment. My argument to solve this puzzle is that where replaceability is high, workers in permanent and temporary contracts have overlapping interests, and governments choose to regulate temporary work to protect permanent workers. In turn, replaceability is higher where permanent workers’ skills are general and wage coordination is low. Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of replaceability — and how this affects governments’ reforms of temporary work regulations — supports my argument. Process tracing of French reforms also confirm that the left has tightened temporary work regulations to compensate for the high replaceability.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The impact of contractor selection method on transaction costs: a review

The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these forms of economic organization. In construction the "make or buy" decision invariably leads to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and the decision to outsource.

What are the costs of procurement and who bears them?

The costs of procurement are transaction costs which are separate from the direct costs of a project. In this paper discussion is concentrated on costs of tendering. Types of cost, including money costs and opportunity costs, short-term and long-term costs, private and social costs are defined and examined in relation to various types of product and methods of procurement. The costs of the contractor and of the client are considered and tentative conclusions drawn as to who bears these costs in the short-run and in the long run. They may fall on the parties to the process for the particular project, on other contractors and clients or on society as a whole.

The impact of market and supply configurations on the costs of tendering in the construction industry

The cost of tendering in the construction industry is widely suspected to be excessive, but there is little robust empirical evidence to demonstrate this. It also seems that innovative working practices may reduce the costs of undertaking construction projects and the consequent improvement in relationships should increase overall value for money. The aim of this proposed research project is to develop mechanisms for measuring the true costs of tendering based upon extensive in-house data collection undertaken in a range of different construction firms. The output from this research will enable all participants in the construction process to make better decisions about how to select members of the team and identify the price and scope of their obligations.

Developing a system for assessing the costs associated with different procurement routes in the construction industry

In developing techniques for monitoring the costs associated with different procurement routes, the central task is disentangling the various project costs incurred by organizations taking part in construction projects. While all firms are familiar with the need to analyse their own costs, it is unusual to apply the same kind of analysis to projects. The purpose of this research is to examine the claims that new ways of working such as strategic alliancing and partnering bring positive business benefits. This requires that costs associated with marketing, estimating, pricing, negotiation of terms, monitoring of performance and enforcement of contract are collected for a cross-section of projects under differing arrangements, and from those in the supply chain from clients to consultants, contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers. Collaboration with industrial partners forms the basis for developing a research instrument, based on time sheets, which will be relevant for all those taking part in the work. The signs are that costs associated with tendering are highly variable, 1-15%, depending upon what precisely is taken into account. The research to date reveals that there are mechanisms for measuring the costs of transactions and these will generate useful data for subsequent analysis.