Do real balance effects invalidate the Taylor principle in closed and open economies?

This paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast-based monetary policy rules that set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a Neo-Wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects. We show that the presence of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the Taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. The problem is exacerbated in open economies, particularly if the policy rule reacts to consumer-price, rather than domestic-price, inflation. However, determinacy can be restored in both closed and open economies with the addition of monetary policy inertia.

Flexible rules cum constrained discretion: a new consensus in monetary policy

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 'normal' circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in 'exceptional' circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of 'rules versus discretion' has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of 'rules cum discretion', in essence as inflation-forecast targeting. But such synthesis is not without major theoretical problems, as we argue in this contribution. Furthermore, the very recent real-world events have made it obvious that the inflation targeting strategy of monetary policy, which rests upon the new consensus paradigm in modern macroeconomics is at best a 'fair weather' model. In the turbulent economic climate of highly unstable inflation, deep financial crisis and world-wide, abrupt economic slowdown nowadays this approach needs serious rethinking to say the least, if not abandoning it altogether

An assessment of the benefits and limitations of the shamba agroforestry system in Kenya and of management and policy requirements for its successful and sustainable reintroduction

The shamba system involves farmers tending tree saplings on state-owned forest land in return for being permitted to intercrop perennial food crops until canopy closure. At one time the system was used throughout all state-owned forest lands in Kenya, accounting for a large proportion of some 160,000 ha. The system should theoretically be mutually beneficial to both local people and the government. However the system has had a chequered past in Kenya due to widespread malpractice and associated environmental degradation. It was last banned in 2003 but in early 2008 field trials were initiated for its reintroduction. This study aimed to: assess the benefits and limitations of the shamba system in Kenya; assess the main influences on the extent to which the limitations and benefits are realised and; consider the management and policy requirements for the system's successful and sustainable operation. Information was obtained from 133 questionnaires using mainly open ended questions and six participatory workshops carried out in forest-adjacent communities on the western slopes of Mount Kenya in Nyeri district. In addition interviews were conducted with key informants from communities and organisations. There was strong desire amongst local people for the system's reintroduction given that it had provided significant food, income and employment. Local perceptions of the failings of the system included firstly mismanagement by government or forest authorities and secondly abuse of the system by shamba farmers and outsiders. Improvements local people considered necessary for the shamba system to work included more accountability and transparency in administration and better rules with respect to plot allocation and stewardship. Ninety-seven percent of respondents said they would like to be more involved in management of the forest and 80% that they were willing to pay for the use of a plot. The study concludes that the structural framework laid down by the 2005 Forests Act, which includes provision for the reimplementation of the shamba system under the new plantation establishment and livelihood improvement scheme (PELIS) [It should be noted that whilst the shamba system was re-branded in 2008 under the acronym PELIS, for the sake of simplicity the authors continue to refer to the 'shamba system' and 'shamba farmers' throughout this paper.], is weakened because insufficient power is likely to be devolved to local people, casting them merely as 'forest users' and the shamba system as a 'forest user right'. In so doing the system's potential to both facilitate and embody the participation of local people in forest management is limited and the long-term sustainability of the new system is questionable. Suggested instruments to address this include some degree of sharing of profits from forest timber, performance related guarantees for farmers to gain a new plot and use of joint committees consisting of local people and the forest authorities for long term management of forests.

To what extent are EU steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy?

In recognition of their competitive vulnerability, a set of special rules have been devised for managing sectors such as steel and cement within the EU ETS. These rules basically seek to set sector specific performance benchmarks and reward top performers. However, the steel sector as a whole will receive the vast majority of its allowances for free in Phase III. Perceptions of competitive vulnerability have been largely based on inherently hypothetical analyses which rely heavily on counterfactual scenario and abatement cost estimates often provided by firms themselves. This paper diverges from these approaches by providing a qualitative assessment of the two key reasons underpinning the competitive vulnerability argument of the EU Steel Companies based on interviews and case study involving the three largest producers of steel within the EU – AcerlorMittal, Corus, and ThyssenKrupp. We find that these arguments provide only partial and weak justifications for competitive loss and discriminatory treatment in the EUETS. This strategy is difficult to counter by governments due to information asymmetry; and it appears to have proved very successful insofar as it has helped the industry to achieve free allocation in Phases I-III of EU ETS by playing up the risk of carbon leakage.

‘Modern Man’s Myths: The Influence of Historical Memory on Policy-Making’

Historical events are interpreted by collectivities in ways that are then instrumentalised in policy-making processes. This creates mythical "truths" and "rules of conduct" which in 20th (21st) century Western civilisations are not much different from those of pre-Enlightenment societies.

Privatisation, empowerment and accountability: What are the policy implications for establishing effective farmer organisations?

Weak institutional development and information flows have constrained the extent to which the small-holder farming sector in developing countries can significantly drive growth and poverty reduction. Thisis despite widely implemented economic liberalisation policies focussing on market efficiency. Farmerorganisations are viewed as a potential means of addressing public and private institutional failure but thishas frequently been limited by inequalities in access to power and information. This article investigatestwo issues that have received little research attention to date: what role downward accountability plays inenabling farmer organisations to improve services and markets, and what influences the extent to whichdownward accountability is achieved. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), one of the largest farmerorganisations in the world (>400,000 farmers) is examined alongside wider literature. Mixed methodswere used including key informant interviews, and eight months of participant observation followedby a questionnaire survey. The article concludes that without effective downward accountability farmerorganisations can become characterised by institutions and mechanisms that favour elites, restrictedweak coordination and regulation, and manipulated information flows. This in turn reduces individuals’incentives to invest. If farmer organisations are to realise their potential as a means of enabling the small-holder sector to significantly contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, policy and researchneeds to address key factors which influence accountability including: how to ensure initial processes information of farmer organisations establish appropriate structures and rules; strong state regulation toenhance corporate accountability; transparent information provision regarding actions of farmer organi-sation leaders; and the role independent non-government organisations can play. Consequently attentionneeds to focus on developing means of legitimising rights, building poor people’s capacity to challengeexclusion, and moving from rights to obligations regarding information provision.

If the British left: agricultural policy outside the CAP?

If the Conservative party wins Britain’s General Election in 2015 the incoming Government intends to negotiate a new settlement with the EU, and then hold an in-out referendum. Opinion polls suggest a narrow majority would vote to leave. To exercise an informed choice the electorate would need to know what feasible alternatives are available, so that these can be assessed and debated. Furthermore, in the event of a no vote the Government must be ready to implement its alternative strategy: Plan B. This implies that both a new EU settlement, and Plan B, need to be negotiated concurrently. There has been no serious attempt to explain what Plan B would mean for UK farm policy. Would, for example, British farmers continue to receive the level of support that they currently enjoy; would support be more focussed on environmental objectives? WTO rules on most-favoured-nation treatment and regional trade agreements would apply. Could a WTO compatible agri-food trade agreement be negotiated with its former EU partners, or would Irish and Brazilian beef face the same tariff barriers on imports into the British market? For the EU, the loss of a major net contributor to EU finances could result in a re-examination of the CAP budget.

Brexit or Bremain? Future options for UK agricultural policy and the CAP

The outcome of the UK’s referendum on continued EU membership is at the time of writing uncertain, and the consequences of a vote to remain (‘Bremain’) or leave (‘Brexit’) difficult to predict. Polarised views have been voiced about the impact of Brexit on UK agriculture, and on the nature and level of funding, of future policy. Policymakers would not have the luxury of devising a new policy from scratch. WTO rules and commitments, the nature of any future accord with the EU, budget constraints, the rather different perspectives of the UK’s devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the expectations of farmers, landowners and the environmental lobby, will all impact the policymaking process. The WTO dimension, and the UK’s future relationship with the EU, are particularly difficult to predict, and – some commentators believe – may take years to resolve. Brexit’s impact on the future CAP is also unclear. A vote to remain within the EU would not necessarily assuage the Eurosceptics’ criticisms of the EU, or the UK’s perception of the CAP. Whatever the outcome, future agricultural, food and rural land use policies will remain key preoccupations of European governments.