Organic certification, export market access and the impacts of policy: Bayesian estimation of avocado smallholder “times-to-organic certification” in Michoacán Mexico

This study analyzes organic adoption decisions using a rich set of time-to-organic durations collected from avocado small-holders in Michoacán Mexico. We derive robust, intrasample predictions about the profiles of entry and exit within the conventional-versus-organic complex and we explore the sensitivity of these predictions to choice of functional form. The dynamic nature of the sample allows us to make retrospective predictions and we establish, precisely, the profile of organic entry had the respondents been availed optimal amounts of adoption-restraining resources. A fundamental problem in the dynamic adoption literature, hitherto unrecognized, is discussed and consequent extensions are suggested.

Strategic trade policy, competition, and welfare: the case of voluntary export restraints between Britain and Japan (1971–2002)

I evaluate the voluntary export restraint placed on Japanese automobile exports from 1977 to 1999 by the UK. I show that the policy failed to assist the British domestic car industry. Instead, UK-based US multi-nationals and Japanese manufacturers were the primary beneficiaries, at a substantial cost to UK consumers. Whilst there are a number of caveats, the policy was on balance damaging to the UK economy in welfare terms.

Towards a nutrient export risk matrix approach to managing agricultural pollution at source

A generic Nutrient Export Risk Matrix (NERM) approach is presented. This provides advice to farmers and policy makers on good practice for reducing nutrient loss and is intended to persuade them to implement such measures. Combined with a range of nutrient transport modelling tools and field experiments, NERMs can play an important role in reducing nutrient export from agricultural land. The Phosphorus Export Risk Matrix (PERM) is presented as an example NERM. The PERM integrates hydrological understanding of runoff with a number of agronomic and policy factors into a clear problem-solving framework. This allows farmers and policy makers to visualise strategies for reducing phosphorus loss through proactive land management. The risk Of Pollution is assessed by a series of informed questions relating to farming intensity and practice. This information is combined with the concept of runoff management to point towards simple, practical remedial strategies which do not compromise farmers' ability to obtain sound economic returns from their crop and livestock.

Developments in the Doha Round and WTO dispute settlement: some implications for EU agricultural policy

Progress in the Doha Round is assessed against the changes to the common agricultural policy (CAP) brought about by the Fischler reforms of 2003-2004, and that proposed for sugar. An elimination of export subsidies could place EU exports of processed foods at a competitive disadvantage because of high sugar and milk prices. Provided the single payment scheme falls within the green box, the likely new limits on domestic support should not be problematic for the post-Fischler CAP. However, an ambitious market access package could open up EU markets and bring pressure for further reform. If there is no Doha agreement, existing provisions will continue to apply, but without the protection of the Peace Clause; and increased litigation is likely. Further CAP reform is to be expected.

The EU's Export Refunds on Processed Foods: Legitimate in the WTO?

Export subsidies on processed foods are an important trade policy instrument for the European Union. GATT Article XVI legitimised the use of export subsidies on primary agricultural products, under certain circumstances, but forbade the use of export subsidies on non-primary products. However it was never satisfactorily resolved whether export subsidies could be paid on the primary agricultural products incorporated into processed products, such as pasta. The Uruguay Round Agreements, and particularly the Agreement on Agriculture (the URAA), apparently legitimised the EU’s practice of paying export subsidies on incorporated agricultural products, at least while the Peace Clause was in force. With the demise of the Peace Clause the question arises whether GATT Article XVI has any residual force, given that the range of primary agricultural products exempted by Article XVI from the ban on export subsidies is narrower than the list of agricultural products covered by the URAA.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

The STEP scale: a measure of short-term export performance improvement

This article is a direct response to a recent observation in the literature that managers appear to be short-term oriented in their assessment of the performance of an export venture (Madsen 1998). On the basis of a cross-national survey of exporting firms, the authors present a three-dimensional scale for assessing managerial judgment of short-term export performance (i.e., the STEP scale). The three dimensions are (1) satisfaction with short-term performance improvement, (2) short-term exporting intensity improvement, and (3) expected short-term performance improvement. The scale presents evidence of reliability as well as convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity, and it reveals factorial similarity and factorial equivalence across both samples. The authors outline managerial and public policy implications that stem from the scale and identify avenues for further export marketing research.

Voluntary export restraints between Britain and Japan: the case of the UK car market (1971–2002)

The rise in international markets of new, productive Japanese car manufacturers provoked intense world competition, which created serious doubts about the economic sustainability of an industry mostly dominated until the 1970s by European and North-American multinational companies. Ultimately, this crisis provoked a deep transformation of the industry, with consequences that had a permanent impact on European companies in the sector. American and later European manufacturers were successful in lobbying governments to provide protection. Using a rich source of data from the UK, I show that the ‘new trade policy’, voluntary export restraint (VER), placed on Japanese exports of new cars from 1977 to December 1999, was binding. This case study illustrates the strategies used by Japanese manufacturers to gain access to the European market through the UK market via strategic alliances and later through transplant production, against which continental European nation states were unable to fully insulate themselves. It is also shown that the policy had a profound effect on the nature of Japanese products, as Japanese firms responded to the quantity restraints by radically altering the product characteristics of their automobiles and shifting towards larger autos and new goods, to maximise their profits subject to the binding constraint.