Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.

Low genetic diversity in a marine nature reserve: re-evaluating diversity criteria in reserve design

Little consideration has been given to the genetic composition of populations associated with marine reserves, as reserve designation is generally to protect specific species, communities or habitats. Nevertheless, it is important to conserve genetic diversity since it provides the raw material for the maintenance of species diversity over longer, evolutionary time-scales and may also confer the basis for adaptation to environmental change. Many current marine reserves are small in size and isolated to some degree (e.g. sea loughs and offshore islands). While such features enable easier management, they may have important implications for the genetic structure of protected populations, the ability of populations to recover from local catastrophes and the potential for marine reserves to act as sources of propagules for surrounding areas. Here, we present a case study demonstrating genetic differentiation, isolation, inbreeding and reduced genetic diversity in populations of the dogwhelk Nucella lapillus in Lough Hyne Marine Nature Reserve (an isolated sea lough in southern Ireland), compared with populations on the local adjacent open coast and populations in England, Wales and France. Our study demonstrates that this sea lough is isolated from open coast populations, and highlights that there may be long-term genetic consequences of selecting reserves on the basis of isolation and ease of protection.

The probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties

This paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently. The empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price, reserve and opening bid. The findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself. Factors such as auction participation, the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications.

The probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties

This paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently. The empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price, reserve and opening bid. The findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself. Factors such as auction participation, the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications.

Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one’s own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors.

Active networks: an evolution of the internet

Active Networks can be seen as an evolution of the classical model of packet-switched networks. The traditional and ”passive” network model is based on a static definition of the network node behaviour. Active Networks propose an “active” model where the intermediate nodes (switches and routers) can load and execute user code contained in the data units (packets). Active Networks are a programmable network model, where bandwidth and computation are both considered shared network resources. This approach opens up new interesting research fields. This paper gives a short introduction of Active Networks, discusses the advantages they introduce and presents the research advances in this field.

How contractors price risk in bids: theory and practice

Formal and analytical models that contractors can use to assess and price project risk at the tender stage have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used in practice. Introducing more models would, therefore, not necessarily help. A better understanding is needed of how contractors arrive at a bid price in practice, and how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment actually influences pricing levels. More than 60 proposed risk models for contractors that are published in journals were examined and classified. Then exploratory interviews with five UK contractors and documentary analyses on how contractors price work generally and risk specifically were carried out to help in comparing the propositions from the literature to what contractors actually do. No comprehensive literature on the real bidding processes used in practice was found, and there is no evidence that pricing is systematic. Hence, systematic risk and pricing models for contractors may have no justifiable basis. Contractors process their bids through certain tendering gateways. They acknowledge the risk that they should price. However, the final settlement depends on a set of complex, micro-economic factors. Hence, risk accountability may be smaller than its true cost to the contractor. Risk apportionment occurs at three stages of the whole bid-pricing process. However, analytical approaches tend not to incorporate this, although they could.

The price of risk in construction projects: contingency approximation model (CAM)

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.

Analytic approximations for multi-asset option pricing

We derive general analytic approximations for pricing European basket and rainbow options on N assets. The key idea is to express the option’s price as a sum of prices of various compound exchange options, each with different pairs of subordinate multi- or single-asset options. The underlying asset prices are assumed to follow lognormal processes, although our results can be extended to certain other price processes for the underlying. For some multi-asset options a strong condition holds, whereby each compound exchange option is equivalent to a standard single-asset option under a modified measure, and in such cases an almost exact analytic price exists. More generally, approximate analytic prices for multi-asset options are derived using a weak lognormality condition, where the approximation stems from making constant volatility assumptions on the price processes that drive the prices of the subordinate basket options. The analytic formulae for multi-asset option prices, and their Greeks, are defined in a recursive framework. For instance, the option delta is defined in terms of the delta relative to subordinate multi-asset options, and the deltas of these subordinate options with respect to the underlying assets. Simulations test the accuracy of our approximations, given some assumed values for the asset volatilities and correlations. Finally, a calibration algorithm is proposed and illustrated.

Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods

In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk managers and financial regulators.

Pro-competitive price beating guarantees: experimental evidence

We report experimental results on duopoly pricing with and without price beating guarantees (PBG). In two control treatments, price beating is either imposed as an industry-wide rule or offered as a business strategy. Our major finding is that when price beating guarantees are imposed as a rule or offered as an option, effective prices are equal to or lower than those in a baseline treatment in which price beating is forbidden. Also, when price beating is treated as a business strategy, less than 50% of subjects adopted the guarantee, suggesting that, subjects realize the pro-competitive effects of the guarantee.

On the evolution of monopoly pricing in Internet-assisted search markets

This study examines the evolution of prices in markets with Internet price-comparison search engines. The empirical study analyzes laboratory data of prices available to informed consumers, for two industry sizes and two conditions on the sample (complete and incomplete). Distributions are typically bimodal. One of the two modes of distribution, corresponding to monopoly pricing, tends to attract such pricing strategies increasingly over time. The second one, corresponding to interior pricing, follows a decreasing trend. Monopoly pricing can serve as a means of insurance against more competitive (but riskier) behavior. In fact, experimental subjects who initially earn low profits due to interior pricing are more likely to switch to monopoly pricing than subjects who experience good returns from the start.

The iso-Score Curve Graph. A new tool for competitive bidding

The present work describes a new tool that helps bidders improve their competitive bidding strategies. This new tool consists of an easy-to-use graphical tool that allows the use of more complex decision analysis tools in the field of Competitive Bidding. The graphic tool described here tries to move away from previous bidding models which attempt to describe the result of an auction or a tender process by means of studying each possible bidder with probability density functions. As an illustration, the tool is applied to three practical cases. Theoretical and practical conclusions on the great potential breadth of application of the tool are also presented.

Estimating future bidding performance of competitor bidders in capped tenders

Research in Bid Tender Forecasting Models (BTFM) has been in progress since the 1950s. None of the developed models were easy-to-use tools for effective use by bidding practitioners because the advanced mathematical apparatus and massive data inputs required. This scenario began to change in 2012 with the development of the Smartbid BTFM, a quite simple model that presents a series of graphs that enables any project manager to study competitors using a relatively short historical tender dataset. However, despite the advantages of this new model, so far, it is still necessary to study all the auction participants as an indivisible group; that is, the original BTFM was not devised for analyzing the behavior of a single bidding competitor or a subgroup of them. The present paper tries to solve that flaw and presents a stand-alone methodology useful for estimating future competitors’ bidding behaviors separately.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.