Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

Testing oligopoly theory in the lab

Previous literature is reviewed to account for the existing experimental tests of standard oligopoly-theoretic models.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

The Farm-Retail Price Spread in an Imperfectly Competitive Food Industry

Gardner's popular model of perfect competition in the marketing sector is extended to a conjectural-variations oligopoly with endogenous entry. Revising Gardner's comparative statics on the "farm-retail price ratio," tests of hypotheses about food industry conduct are derived. Using data from a recent article by Wohlgenant, which employs Gardner's framework, tests are made of the validity of his maintained hypothesis-that the food industries are perfectly competitive. No evidence is found of departures from competition in the output markets of the food industries of eight commodity groups: (a) beef and veal, (b) pork, (c) poultry, (d) eggs, (e) dairy, (f) processed fruits and vegetables, (g) fresh fruit, and (h) fresh vegetables.

Consistent comparative statics for the food industries

Consistent conjectures are derived in an oligopoly model with homogeneous products and identical firms. The exercise uncovers two important findings. Absent entry, the monopolistic conjecture, is the unique consistent conjecture. With endogenous entry, no consistent conjecture exists. These results provide foundations for deriving consistentc omparatives taticsf or the food industries

Reworking the NAFTA: departures from traditional frameworks

This paper reviews the treatment of intellectual property rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and considers the welfare-theoretic bases for innovation transfer between member and nonmember states. Specifically, we consider the effects of new technology development from within the union and question whether it is efficient (in a welfare sense) to transfer that new technology to nonmember states. When the new technology contains stochastic components, the important issue of information exchange arises and we consider this question in a simple oligopoly model with Bayesian updating. In this context, it is natural to ask the optimal price at which such information should be transferred. Some simple, natural conjugate examples are used to motivate the key parameters upon which the answer is dependent

Non-competitive markets

Among all the paradigms in economic theory, the theoretical predictions of oligopoly were the first to be examined in the laboratory. In this chapter, instead of surveying all the experiments with few sellers, we adopt a narrower definition of the term “oligopoly”, and focus on the experiments that were directly inspired by the basic oligopolistic models of Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling, Stackelberg, and some extensions. Most of the experiments we consider in this chapter have been run in the last three decades. This literature can be considered as a new wave of experimental works aiming at representing basic oligopolistic markets and testing their properties. The chapter is divided into independent sections referring to different parts of the oligopolistic theory, including both monopoly as well as a number of extensions of the basic models, which have been chosen with the aim of providing a representative list of the relevant experimental findings.

Internalization theory: an unfinished agenda

Internalization theory is usually applied at the firm level to analyse FDI, licensing and subcontracting, but this paper extends it to the industry level. It synthesises internalisation theory and oligopoly theory. It analyses a global industry where firms innovate competitively, and freely enter and exit the industry. It presents a formal model which highlights the inter-dependencies between rival firms. Each firm responds to its rivals by jointly optimising production and innovation through inter-dependent ownership and location decisions. The competitive outcome determines which firms serve which markets, which firms enter or exit the industry, and the internalisation strategy of each firm.