Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

MFN status and the choice of tariff regime

The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tariffs implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade. We investigate whether a regime of uniform tariffs will be preferable to discriminatory tariffs when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product differentiation and asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries will disagree on the choice of tariff regime. When the choice of import tariffs and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tariff regime may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discriminatory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance with tariff agreement.

Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs

We analyze the non-cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher-cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower-cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.

Reversible thermal transition of polydiacetylene based on KTTKS collagen sequence

Here we explore the physico-chemical properties of a peptide amphiphile obtained by chemical conjugation of the collagenstimulating peptide KTTKS with 10,12-pentacosadiynoic acid which photopolymerizes as a stable and extended polydiacetylene. We investigate the self-assembly of this new polymer and rationalize its peculiar behavior in terms of a thermal conformational transition. Surprisingly, this polymer shows a thermal transition associated with a non-cooperative increase in b-sheet content at high temperature.

Studying economics reduces overexploitation in a common resource experiment

This paper studies the economic behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economic experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR, taking into account the influence of economics training on the learning process of individuals, regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economics knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

Study of optimization for cooperative motion between two humans in mutual tracking

Verbal communication is essential for human society and human civilization. Non-verbal communication, on the other hand, is more widely used not only by human but also other kind of animals, and the content of information is estimated even larger than the verbal communication. Among the non-verbal communication mutual motion is the simplest and easiest to study experimentally and analytically. We measured the power spectrum of the hand velocity in various conditions and clarified the following points on the feed-back and feed- forward mechanism as basic knowledge to understand the condition of good communication.

A review of Islamic mutual funds’ financial performance and investment style in Muslim and non-Muslim countries

Islamic finance has grown beyond its reputation of providing small-scale banking options and now provides investment and financing options for complex large-scale commercial transactions. Islamic investments are one area that has attracted the attention of investors due to its performance, especially during the economic downturn. The Shari’ah compliance nature of Islamic funds provides an opportunity for those Muslim investors to be part of the global investment sector who have previously been reluctant to invest in conventional mutual funds. The fact that the funds’ managers are prohibited from investing in activities such as weapons production, alcohol production and interest-bearing finance operations, makes Islamic mutual funds also attractive for those Non-Muslim investors who wish to invest ethically. Today there are hundreds of Islamic equity indices offered by Dow Jones, FTSE, MSCI and S&P. Despite the growing importance of Islamic funds, there have been limited studies exploring the performance of Islamic funds worldwide. Due to very limited data sets and not too rigorous analytical methods, these existent studies have neither investigated Islamic funds’ financial performance in noticeable detail nor analysed the investment style of more than six funds. For instance, relevant questions such as the financial performance of Islamic mutual funds’ beyond their investment styles or a difference in performance between funds from Muslim and non-Muslim countries have nearly not been investigated at all. Very recently, a study by Hoepner, Rammal and Rezec (2011) analysed the financial performance and investment style of 262 Islamic equity funds from 20 countries in five regions (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Gulf Cooperative Council-GCC, and North America). As comparison, previous studies did not even analyse 60 funds. Hoepner et al.’s study sampled a period of two decades and was therefore able to test the performance of the funds during economic booms as well as economic downturns. The findings of the study provide new insights into the performance of Islamic mutual funds in Muslim and Western markets and during financial crisis.

Non-competitive markets

Among all the paradigms in economic theory, the theoretical predictions of oligopoly were the first to be examined in the laboratory. In this chapter, instead of surveying all the experiments with few sellers, we adopt a narrower definition of the term “oligopoly”, and focus on the experiments that were directly inspired by the basic oligopolistic models of Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling, Stackelberg, and some extensions. Most of the experiments we consider in this chapter have been run in the last three decades. This literature can be considered as a new wave of experimental works aiming at representing basic oligopolistic markets and testing their properties. The chapter is divided into independent sections referring to different parts of the oligopolistic theory, including both monopoly as well as a number of extensions of the basic models, which have been chosen with the aim of providing a representative list of the relevant experimental findings.