La monarquia francesa y los financieros en el Antiguo Régimen. El ejemplo de los traitants durante la Guerra de los Nueve Años, 1689-1697 = The French Monarchy and the financiers during the Old Regime. The case of the traitants during the Nine Years War, 1689-1697

This article explores the relationship between the Crown, the French society and the king's financiers. It starts with a brief review of the discourses on the financiers and a survey of the work done by historians. Further to a description of the various groups of financiers, it analyses the nature of the contracts passed between the king and the traitants to pay for the Nine Years War, as well as the latter’s activities and profits. The article argues that the government supervised effectively the traitants and that, given the constraints of the Old Regime, these financiers provided essential services, but too costly to be sustainable.

Comprendre l'opposition parlementaire: le Parlement de Paris face aux réformes de Silhouette (1759)

The aim of this article is to reconsider the fiscal interpretation of opposition parlementaire to government policy. First, it suggests that the meaning of the remonstrances is blurred by specific constraints which make it very difficult to interpret these texts. Second, it analyses a variety of documents relating to Silhouette’s fiscal projects (1759) and shows that the real objective of the Parlement of Paris, which was never mentioned in its remonstrances, was to finance the Seven Years’ War by issuing paper-money. This reading reveals the influence of the British model of State finance, especially on the critical issue of credit, on both ministers and magistrates. In spite of this common reference, the government and the Parlement of Paris diverged in their reading of the fiscal crisis, and the political culture of the monarchy prevented the formation of a workable consensus.

Entre moralité et politique: l’éducation de Louis XV et la question de l’instruction financière du prince sous l’Ancien Régime

Studies on princely education rarely focus on the training received by future kings to perform one of their key functions – supervising the finances of the monarchy. Failure to address this issue is all the more surprising than one of the major consequences of Louis XIV’s coronation was to grant the king the direction of finances until the French Revolution, thus raising the issue of the financial education of the prince. Based on a largely unpublished body of primary sources, especially several manuscripts specifically written for the financial education of Louis XV and princes in the XVIIIth century, this article explores the teaching approaches and programme of a highly technical nature that the king’s tutors considered essential to the monarch’s duties.

Il culto dell’Uno dal Risorgimento al fascismo

This article (here in English; the published version is in Italian) explores the political parameters surrounding the development of personality cults of leading figures in Italian history from the time of unification to the present. It focuses on the problems of linking the masses to the state, with particular reference to the weakness of the monarchy and the challenge of rival forces, such as those of the Church. It looks at how attempts were made to 'nationalise' the monarchy and create a cult of Victor Emmanuel II. It examines the construction of the cult of Garibaldi, and its relationship to the state. The article suggests that personality cults, while far from being unique to Italy, were seen as having special relevance in Italy given the weakness of the representative institutions and the sensed fragmentation of political life. The article concludes with an examination of the cult of Mussolini and some reflections on the situation since 1945.

Theology and politics in Richard Hooker's thought

Although Richard Hooker’s private attitudes were clericalist and authoritarian, his constitutional theory subordinated clergymen to laymen and monarchy to parliamentary statute. This article explains why his political ideas were nonetheless appropriate to his presumed religious purposes. It notes a very intimate connection between his teleological conception of a law and his hostility towards conventional high Calvinist ideas about predestination. The most significant anomaly within his broadly Aristotelian world-view was his belief that politics is nothing but a means to cope with sin. This too can be linked to his religious ends, but it creates an ambiguity that made his doctrines usable by Locke.

Sparta and the English Republic

In 1659-60, James Harrington and Henry Stubbe, two republican authors, engaged in a bad-tempered pamphlet debate about the constitution of classical Sparta. This took place in the context of political collapse after the fall of the Cromwellian Protectorate, as republicans desperately attempted to devise safeguards which could prevent the return of monarchy. Questions of constitutional form were not always at the forefront of 1650s English republicanism, but Harrington’s ideal constitution of ‘Oceana’ brought these questions to the fore in 1659’s discussions. Sparta formed a key plank of the ‘ancient prudence’ which supported Harrington’s theory, and like Stubbe he drew on Nicolaus Cragius’ De Republica Lacedaemoniorum (1593) for evidence, and was attracted to some of the more apparently ‘aristocratic’ elements of the Spartan constitution. However, classical texts and modern scholarly authority, such as Cragius’, were not the only ingredients in the English version of the ‘classical republican’ tradition; sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political thinkers and current exigencies also shaped Harrington and Stubbe’s arguments. Both Harrington and Stubbe ended up challenging the scholarly and ancient consensus that Sparta was an aristocracy or mixed polity, Harrington reinterpreting it to assimilate it to ‘democracy’, and Stubbe attempting to rehabilitate a model of benign ‘oligarchy’.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.

Los historiadores y los financieros de la Francia del Antiguo Régimen

This article proposes a brief historiographical survey of works on the financiers of Ancien Regime France. It argues that the historians’ main conclusions vary according to the period they study and their main research issue (e.g. the building of the Absolute monarchy, financial crises, economic growth). It suggests that the new consensus about the social origins of the financiers does not fully clarify the question of their perception by the public and their role in the monarchy. It notes that the activities of the financiers were varied and evolved over time, and that the technical aspects of their activities remain poorly known, making it difficult to offer a simple answer to the broad question of their worth and their cost for the monarchy.