Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

The politics of CAP reform: Trade negotiations, institutional settings and blame avoidance

In this article we argue that the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the subsequent role of the WTO has changed the international context of CAP policy-making. However, comparing the three latest CAP reforms, we demonstrate that pressures on the CAP arising from international trade negotiations cannot alone account for the way in which the EU responds in terms of CAP reform. The institutional setting within which the reform package was determined also played a crucial role. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the CoAM seems to be a more conducive setting than the European Council for undertaking substantial reform of the CAP. We suggest that the choice of institutional setting is influenced by the desire of farm ministers and of heads of state or government to avoid blame for unpopular decisions. When CAP reform is an integral part of a broader package, farm ministers pass the final decision to the European Council and when CAP reform is defined as a separate issue the European Council avoids involvement.

Explaining the 'health check' of the Common Agricultural Policy: budgetary politics, globalisation and paradigm change revisited

Three potential explanations of past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be identified in the literature: a budget constraint, pressure from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) negotiations or commitments and a paradigm shift emphasising agriculture’s provision of public goods. This discussion on the driving forces of CAP reform links to broader theoretical questions on the role of budgetary politics, globalisation of public policy and paradigm shift in explaining policy change. In this article, the Health Check reforms of 2007/2008 are assessed. They were probably more ambitious than first supposed, although it was a watered-down package agreed by ministers in November 2008. We conclude that the Health Check was not primarily driven by budget concerns or by the supposed switch from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. The European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory factor. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-2013 is contested with divergent views among the Member States.

Comprendre l'opposition parlementaire: le Parlement de Paris face aux réformes de Silhouette (1759)

The aim of this article is to reconsider the fiscal interpretation of opposition parlementaire to government policy. First, it suggests that the meaning of the remonstrances is blurred by specific constraints which make it very difficult to interpret these texts. Second, it analyses a variety of documents relating to Silhouette’s fiscal projects (1759) and shows that the real objective of the Parlement of Paris, which was never mentioned in its remonstrances, was to finance the Seven Years’ War by issuing paper-money. This reading reveals the influence of the British model of State finance, especially on the critical issue of credit, on both ministers and magistrates. In spite of this common reference, the government and the Parlement of Paris diverged in their reading of the fiscal crisis, and the political culture of the monarchy prevented the formation of a workable consensus.

The future of the tenanted sector in British agriculture: a review of the proposals for change

The impending decline of the tenanted sector in British agriculture has been forecast for many years. Much debate has surrounded the issues and ensuing legislation has repeatedly attempted to stave-off what some view as the inevitable demise of tenant farmers. Following a flurry of activity after the Northfield Report of 1979 and culminating in the Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1984 and 1986, the debate has recently been fuelled by a strongly pro-market lobby. With the public support of successive Ministers of Agriculture, this lobby has advocated a rejection of the former state intervention in the landlord/tenant relationship in favour of freedom of contract, an option that now appears increasingly likely to reach the statute books. This paper reviews the significant elements of the debate, attempting to explain the principal reasons for the failure of earlier legislation and the primary shortcomings of the current emphasis of consultation. The paper concludes that while there are some significant legislative disincentives to letting land, the freeing-up of contracts in isolation from other, non-contractual issues, will not result in the increase in lettings purportedly desired by the Ministers and their acolytes.

Another reform? proposals for the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy

Following two decades of policy change, in 2011 the European Commission tabled proposals for a new ‘reform’ of the CAP. A major component of the reform would be a revamping of the existing system of direct payments to farmers. For example, 30% of the spend would be dependent on farmers respecting new greening criteria; and payments would be restricted to active farmers and subject to a payment cap. These proposals will be debated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament throughout 2012, and possibly 2013, before final decisions are reached. What aspects, if any, of the proposals will prove acceptable is yet to be discerned. Although tabled as part of a financial package, the proposals do not appear to be driven by financial exigency: indeed they seek to maintain the expenditure status quo. Nor do they appear to be driven by international pressures: if anything, they backtrack on previous attempts to bring the CAP into conformity with a post-Doha WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Instead they seek to establish a new partnership between society and ‘farmers, who keep rural areas alive, who are in contact with the ecosystems and who produce the food we eat’ (Cioloș 2011), in an attempt to justify continuing support.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

CAP reform, 2005-14, and the muted role of the dis-United Kingdom

In 2003 the CAP underwent a significant reform. Despite a seemingly endless turmoil of CAP reform, in 2005 the British government pressed for a new reform debate, and in the European Council meeting of December 2005 secured a commitment for the Commission “to undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, ...” But but the initiative petered out, and the CAP ‘reform’ package proposed by the Commission, and then adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in 2013, fell well short of the UK’s initial ambition. The chapter attempts to explore the reasons leading to the UK’s failed policy initiative.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.