The metaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism

In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.

Discussion on the importance of making things right

Critical notice of 'From metaphysics to ethics' by Frank Jackson.

Reading Derrida on mathematics

This article engages with the claims of Anne Brubaker that “[n]ow that the dust has settled after the so-called ‘Science Wars’ […] it is an opportune time to reassess the ways in which poststructural theory both argues persuasively for mathematics as a culturally embedded practice – a method as opposed to a metaphysics – and, at the same time, reinscribes realist notions of mathematics as a noise-free description of a mind independent reality.” Through a close re-reading of Jacques Derrida’s work I argue, in alliance with Vicki Kirby’s critique of the work of Brian Rotman, not only that Brubaker misunderstands Derrida’s “writing” but also that her argument constitutes a typical instance of much wider misreadings of Derrida and “poststructuralism” across a range of disciplines in terms of the ways in which her text re-institutes the very stabilities it itself attributes to Derrida’s texts.

Could there be a superhuman species?

Transhumanism is the school of thought that advocates the use of technology to enhance the human species, to the point where some supporters consider that a new species altogether could arise. Even some critics think this at least a technological possibility. Some supporters also believe the emergence of a new, improved, superhuman species raises no special ethical questions. Through an examination of the metaphysics of species, and an analysis of the essence of the human species, I argue that the existence of an embodied, genuinely superhuman species is a metaphysical impossibility. Finally, I point out an interesting ethical consideration that this metaphysical truth raises.