Type-1 error inflation in the traditional by-participant analysis to metamemory accuracy: a generalized mixed-effects model perspective

In order to examine metacognitive accuracy (i.e., the relationship between metacognitive judgment and memory performance), researchers often rely on by-participant analysis, where metacognitive accuracy (e.g., resolution, as measured by the gamma coefficient or signal detection measures) is computed for each participant and the computed values are entered into group-level statistical tests such as the t-test. In the current work, we argue that the by-participant analysis, regardless of the accuracy measurements used, would produce a substantial inflation of Type-1 error rates, when a random item effect is present. A mixed-effects model is proposed as a way to effectively address the issue, and our simulation studies examining Type-1 error rates indeed showed superior performance of mixed-effects model analysis as compared to the conventional by-participant analysis. We also present real data applications to illustrate further strengths of mixed-effects model analysis. Our findings imply that caution is needed when using the by-participant analysis, and recommend the mixed-effects model analysis.

The effects of distraction on metacognition and metacognition on distraction: evidence from recognition memory

The effects of auditory distraction in memory tasks have been examined to date with procedures that minimize participants’ control over their own memory processes. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to metacognitive control factors which might affect memory performance. In this study, we investigate the effects of auditory distraction on metacognitive control of memory, examining the effects of auditory distraction in recognition tasks utilizing the metacognitive framework of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), to determine whether strategic regulation of memory accuracy is impacted by auditory distraction. Results replicated previous findings in showing that auditory distraction impairs memory performance in tasks minimizing participants’ metacognitive control (forced-report test). However, the results revealed also that when metacognitive control is allowed (free-report tests), auditory distraction impacts upon a range of metacognitive indices. In the present study, auditory distraction undermined accuracy of metacognitive monitoring (resolution), reduced confidence in responses provided and, correspondingly, increased participants’ propensity to withhold responses in free-report recognition. Crucially, changes in metacognitive processes were related to impairment in free-report recognition performance, as the use of the ‘don’t know’ option under distraction led to a reduction in the number of correct responses volunteered in free-report tests. Overall, the present results show how auditory distraction exerts its influence on memory performance via both memory and metamemory processes.