Friendly amendment: a commentary on Doyle and Ford's proposed re-definition of 'mental model'

Some amendments are proposed to a recent redefinition of the mental model concept in system dynamics. First, externalised, or articulated mental models should not be called cognitive maps; this term has a well established, alternative meaning. Second, there can be mental models of entities not yet existing beyond an individual's mind; the modelling of planned or desired systems is possible and recommended. Third, saying that mental models maintain social systems connects with some exciting research opportunities for system dynamics; however, it is probably an accidental distraction from the intended meaning of the redefinition. These minor criticisms apart, the new definition of mental model of a dynamic system is welcomed as a useful contribution to both research and practice.

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “which city is largest” – the “larger” question – versus “which city is smallest” – the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a, 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a three-alternative forced choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.