Pesticide productivity and transgenic cotton technology: The South African smallholder case

This paper empirically investigates how the productivity of pesticide differs in Bt versus non-Bt technology for South African cotton smallholders, and what the implications for pesticide use levels are in the two technologies. This is accomplished by applying a damage control framework to farm-level data from Makhathini flats, KwaZulu-Natal. Contrary to findings elsewhere, notably China, that farmers over-use pesticides and that transgenic technology benefits farmers by enabling large reductions in pesticide use, the econometric evidence here indicates that non-Bt smallholders in South Africa under-use pesticide. Thus, the main potential contribution of the new technology is to enable them to realise lost productivity resulting from under-use. By providing a natural substitute for pesticide, the Bt technology enables the smallholders to circumvent credit and labour constraints associated with pesticide application. Thus, the same technology that greatly reduces pesticide applications but only mildly affects yields, when used by large-scale farmers in China and elsewhere, benefits South-African smallholder farmers primarily via a yield-enhancing effect.

Exposing the myth of the 1:5:200 ratio relating initial cost, maintenance and staffing costs of office buildings

In an attempt to focus clients' minds on the importance of considering the construction and maintenance costs of a commercial office building (both as a factor in staff productivity and as a fraction of lifetime staff costs) there is an often-quoted ratio of costs of 1:5:200, where for every one pound spent on construction cost, five are spent on maintenance and building operating costs and 200 on staffing and business operating costs. This seems to stem from a paper published by the Royal Academy of Engineering, in which no data is given and no derivation or defence of the ratio appears. The accompanying belief that higher quality design and construction increases staff productivity, and simultaneously reduces maintenance costs, how ever laudable, appears unsupported by research, and carries all the hallmarks of an "urban myth". In tracking down data about real buildings, a more realistic ratio appears to depend on a huge variety of variables, as well as the definition of the number of "lifetime" years. The ill-defined origins of the original ratio (1:5:200) describing these variables have made replication impossible. However, by using published sources of data, we have found that for three office buildings, a more realistic ratio is 1:0.4:12. As there is nothing in the public domain about what comprised the original research that gave rise to 1:5:200, it is not possible to make a true comparison between these new calculations and the originals. Clients and construction professionals stand to be misled because the popularity and widespread use of the wrong ratio appears to be mis-informing important investment and policy decisions.

The British ‘failure’ that never was? The Anglo-American ‘productivity gap’ in large-scale interwar retailing—evidence from the department store sector

Interwar British retailing has been characterized as having lower productivity, less developed managerial hierarchies and methods, and weaker scale economies than its US counterpart. This article examines comparative productivity for one major segment of large-scale retailing in both countries—the department store sector. Drawing on exceptionally detailed contemporary survey data, we show that British department stores in fact achieved superior performance in terms of operating costs, margins, profits, and stock-turn. While smaller British stores had lower labour productivity than US stores of equivalent size, TFP was generally higher for British stores, which also enjoyed stronger scale economies. We also examine the reasons behind Britain's surprisingly strong relative performance, using surviving original returns from the British surveys. Contrary to arguments that British retailers faced major barriers to the development of large-scale enterprises, that could reap economies of scale and scope and invest in machinery and marketing to support the growth of their primary sales functions, we find that British department stores enthusiastically embraced the retail ‘managerial revolution’—and reaped substantial benefits from this investment.