Setting UK standards on the concept of control: an analysis of lobbying behaviour

The present study aims to contribute to an understanding of the complexity of lobbying activities within the accounting standard-setting process in the UK. The paper reports detailed content analysis of submission letters to four related exposure drafts. These preceded two accounting standards that set out the concept of control used to determine the scope of consolidation in the UK, except for reporting under international standards. Regulation on the concept of control provides rich patterns of lobbying behaviour due to its controversial nature and its significance to financial reporting. Our examination is conducted by dividing lobbyists into two categories, corporate and non-corporate, which are hypothesised (and demonstrated) to lobby differently. In order to test the significance of these differences we apply ANOVA techniques and univariate regression analysis. Corporate respondents are found to devote more attention to issues of specific applicability of the concept of control, whereas non-corporate respondents tend to devote more attention to issues of general applicability of this concept. A strong association between the issues raised by corporate respondents and their line of business is revealed. Both categories of lobbyists are found to advance conceptually-based arguments more often than economic consequences-based or combined arguments. However, when economic consequences-based arguments are used, they come exclusively from the corporate category of respondents.

Brand protection and the globalization of British business

In expanding on earlier analyses of the evolution of multinational business that have drawn from concepts of competition and innovation, this study examines the strategies used by British multinationals, between 1870 and 1929, to protect the global reputation of their brands, which were crucial to their survival and success. Even after the passage of new trademark legislation in 1876, enforcement of trademarks remained expensive, and often firms preferred to negotiate, rather than to prosecute violations. Many trademark imitators were based in the newly industrializing countries of the time—the United States, Germany, and Japan—and were part of the British export supply chains as licensees, franchisees, or wholesalers. British firms responded to infringements by lobbying governments, appointing local agents to provide intelligence, and collaborating with other firms.

How large is congressional dependence in agriculture. Bayesian inference about ‘scale’ and ‘scope’ in measuring a spatial externality

The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour.

Voluntary export restraints between Britain and Japan: the case of the UK car market (1971–2002)

The rise in international markets of new, productive Japanese car manufacturers provoked intense world competition, which created serious doubts about the economic sustainability of an industry mostly dominated until the 1970s by European and North-American multinational companies. Ultimately, this crisis provoked a deep transformation of the industry, with consequences that had a permanent impact on European companies in the sector. American and later European manufacturers were successful in lobbying governments to provide protection. Using a rich source of data from the UK, I show that the ‘new trade policy’, voluntary export restraint (VER), placed on Japanese exports of new cars from 1977 to December 1999, was binding. This case study illustrates the strategies used by Japanese manufacturers to gain access to the European market through the UK market via strategic alliances and later through transplant production, against which continental European nation states were unable to fully insulate themselves. It is also shown that the policy had a profound effect on the nature of Japanese products, as Japanese firms responded to the quantity restraints by radically altering the product characteristics of their automobiles and shifting towards larger autos and new goods, to maximise their profits subject to the binding constraint.