The perception of emotion from body movement in point-light displays of interpersonal dialogue

We examined whether it is possible to identify the emotional content of behaviour from point-light displays where pairs of actors are engaged in interpersonal communication. These actors displayed a series of emotions, which included sadness, anger, joy, disgust, fear, and romantic love. In experiment 1, subjects viewed brief clips of these point-light displays presented the right way up and upside down. In experiment 2, the importance of the interaction between the two figures in the recognition of emotion was examined. Subjects were shown upright versions of (i) the original pairs (dyads), (ii) a single actor (monad), and (iii) a dyad comprising a single actor and his/her mirror image (reflected dyad). In each experiment, the subjects rated the emotional content of the displays by moving a slider along a horizontal scale. All of the emotions received a rating for every clip. In experiment 1, when the displays were upright, the correct emotions were identified in each case except disgust; but, when the displays were inverted, performance was significantly diminished for some ernotions. In experiment 2, the recognition of love and joy was impaired by the absence of the acting partner, and the recognition of sadness, joy, and fear was impaired in the non-veridical (mirror image) displays. These findings both support and extend previous research by showing that biological motion is sufficient for the perception of emotion, although inversion affects performance. Moreover, emotion perception from biological motion can be affected by the veridical or non-veridical social context within the displays.

Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.

Workaround motivation model (WAMM): an adaptation of the Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour

The study of workarounds (WA) has increased in importance due to their impact on patient safety and efficiency. However, there are no adequate theories to explain the motivation to create and use a workaround in a healthcare sitting. Although theories of technology acceptance help to understand the reasons to accept or reject technology, they fail to explain drivers for alternatives. Also workarounds involve creators and performers that have different motivations. Models such as Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) or Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) can help to explain the role of workaround users, but lack explanation of workaround creators’ dynamics. Our aim is to develop a theoretical foundation to explain workaround motivation behaviour models with norms that relate to sanctions to provide an integrated Workaround Motivation Model; WAMM. The development of WAMM model is explained in this paper based on workaround cases as part of further research to establish the model.

A new argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color: a response to Gómez-Torrente

I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez-Torrente 2014).